Dirty Diplomacy: U.S. Diplomacy, Human Rights, and the Argentinian Dirty War

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In my high school Honors Spanish III class, much of our coursework was grounded in the culture and history of Spanish-speaking Latin American countries. As a result, we analyzed and discussed everything from the way people greet each other to movies such as *Tambien la Lluvia*. For me, the most interesting part was learning about the Dirty War. I read *La Guerra Sucia* and found its storytelling of the kidnapping of a single mom of two teenage boys incredibly sobering. After that, I watched *Infancia clandestina*, which depicted the daily lives and struggles of a family of anti-junta Montoneros. I then briefly learned of America’s involvement in the matter and became interested in uncovering the secrets behind its participation in such a horrible event.

The records of U.S. involvement, contact, and communication with the Argentine military dictatorship at the time give insight into how a conflict of interests in diplomacy can lead to disastrous results. In this case, the covert dealings between America and Argentina under President Gerald Ford ensured that human rights abuses against innocent Argentinians would continue throughout the Dirty War. Therefore, the Ford Administration’s foreign policy and diplomatic efforts in Argentina were not beneficial to the good of the people; it chose to prioritize the elimination of left-wing Peronists and communists over human rights. The Carter Administration acted in stark contrast to the Ford Administration, as it prioritized human rights in its foreign relations and policies. The subject of diplomacy can therefore be viewed through the lens of the differences between these two presidencies regarding the Dirty War.

To gain a more comprehensive knowledge of the Dirty War, I used encyclopedic secondary sources to obtain a clearer grasp of its timeline and the key issues involved. With that background, I then began to read about the United States’ general foreign policy under the two presidents who presided during the Dirty War to better understand America’s motivations for
dealing with the Argentine junta in the ways that it did. The distinct foreign policies of the Carter Administration and Ford Administration helped contextualize their actions during the Dirty War.

The major components of my research were secret messages, memos, reports, etc. made by the U.S. government. The ones I reviewed were part of the 47,000 pages worth of declassified documents that the White House finished turning over in 2019. In papers detailing conversations between the U.S. and Argentina, I looked specifically at the diplomatic measures that were communicated—what goals was the U.S. trying to achieve, and what relationship did it want to maintain with the junta? In documents recording White House staff meetings or memos sent within the presidential administration, I analyzed the agendas set for working with the Argentine junta and internal disagreements within the White House. Though I knew the U.S. had turned a blind eye toward human rights, I was surprised to discover that many White House officials treated the lives of thousands of people as bargaining chips to use during diplomatic exchanges.
“As many people as necessary must die in Argentina so that the country will again be secure.”

– Jorge Rafael Videla

Following the deposition of President Isabel Perón by the military junta, Argentina fell into a fraught civil war lasting from 1976 to 1983. Known as the Dirty War, the right-wing military dictatorship that took power on March 24, 1976 determinedly stamped out all hints of left-wing political opposition. In a campaign known as the Process of National Reorganization, the junta closed the National Congress, imposed censorship, and brought state and municipal governments under their control. The war was characterized by widespread violence against civilians, with an estimated ten to thirty thousand people either killed and/or disappeared.

The United States government was keenly attuned to the human rights atrocities being committed, although most Americans and Argentinians alike were unaware of this. In a wide-scale movement known as Operation Condor, the U.S. allied with the governments of several South American nations and backed a system of covert political repression using intelligence and assassination operations. Although the U.S. proclaimed it followed a policy of détente with regard to the Cold War, in reality, it staunchly opposed any signs of left political ideology in its Western hemisphere of influence. Fearing the spread of left-wing ideologies such as Peronism, America allied itself with oppressive right-wing dictatorships, providing financial and military support. The military junta in the Dirty War was not an exception to this, as the United States Government (USG) communicated with the new regime primarily under two presidential administrations—those of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. Under Ford’s administration (August 9, 1974 – January 10, 1977), America was explicit in its desire to help the new Argentine regime, even in the face of human rights violations; therefore, it provided few expectations on how the
Government of Argentina (GOA) should treat the delicate human rights situation. Ford’s adherence to containing communism in the Western hemisphere meant his administration was much keener on maintaining relations with the new regime and its communism-suppressing activities than ensuring it would not abuse its authority to traverse human rights boundaries.

In contrast, the Carter Administration (January 20, 1977 – January 20, 1981) placed an emphasis on human rights and was therefore much more explicit in its diplomatic exchanges with the junta regarding the issue. As Carter—a steadfast supporter of human rights—stepped into the presidency, his administration quickly began to confront the Argentine junta over the situation. The U.S. began to outline incentivized expectations and subtle demands through diplomatic avenues such as decreased funding and military support in an attempt to influence the actions of the Argentine government. Their efforts visibly helped improve the situation, as the number of human rights abuses sharply began to decrease in the 1980s.1 U.S. diplomacy in the Dirty War not only gives insight into the difference between the Ford and the Carter administrations’ priority on Cold War policies over human rights; it also demonstrates that, although the U.S. ostensibly followed a policy of détente, it inevitably reverted to its old containment policies when leftist political groups began threatening its influence over Latin America.

Under the Ford Administration

Largely because Ford took over the presidency after Nixon’s resignation, foreign policy under the Ford Administration took on a very similar form as it did under the Nixon Administration, which focused on Cold War tensions with the Soviet Union and its allies.

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Although Nixon’s détente was the supposed policy during this time, Ford ultimately rebounded to old containment policies to stamp out communist influence in America’s Western hemisphere of influence. The fact that the new Argentine regime was doing exactly that meant the White House was willing to turn a blind eye to the human rights abuses taking place in favor of what it perceived as a greater goal.

The Ford Administration was aware of the military coup months before it occurred. In February 1976, Robert Hill, the U.S. Ambassador to Argentina, reported to the White House that the junta had confessed it would likely conduct wide-scale executions to secure power. With this information, Hill continued, “It is encouraging to note that the Argentine military … are already focusing on ways to avoid letting human rights issues become an irritant in US-Argentine relations.” The fact he was focused on the burden of diplomatic complaints over human rights issues rather than the issues themselves illustrates the USG’s budding preference for its containment agenda over human rights. In July of that year, an evening report for Ford revealed that exiles under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ protection had been abducted and beaten with at least the tacit approval of Argentine officials. The report also detailed the murders of leaders of the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), a militant communist group. It concluded by nonchalantly positing that the junta had apparently resolved to use whatever means necessary to eliminate “terrorists” such as the ERP, once and for all. This indifferent attitude would later come to influence the decisions the U.S. made over this issue.

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4 Ibid.
From the beginning of the Dirty War, the U.S. government planned to support the dictatorship. In Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s weekly staff meeting on March 26, 1976—a mere two days after the military coup—the U.S. was already assessing the junta as a viable investment toward suppressing left-wing opponents. William Rogers, the Assistant Secretary of State, promoted financial support for Argentina during the meeting, arguing, “we’re going to look for a considerable effort to involve the United States – particularly in the financial field. I think we’re going to see a good deal.”5 To provide the junta with the economic support it needed, Rogers outlined a plan for a program of international assistance using private banks and other financial institutions. A day later, the International Monetary Fund, an institution over which the U.S. has considerable influence, released a $127 million credit for the new Argentine regime. However, Rogers also predicted the political transition would be an arduous process with “probably a good deal of blood, in Argentina before too long.”6 He therefore advised against immediately embracing the new regime in fear of getting caught up with human rights violations. In response, Kissinger reiterated his goals, stating, “I do want to encourage [the junta]. I don’t want to give the sense that they’re harassed by the United States.”7 Kissinger thus made it clear from the beginning that supporting the junta was in the USG’s best interests; he was willing to stand by and watch as people died because their deaths aligned with American anti-communism goals.

The U.S. revealed its Operation Condor objectives to the junta in a secret conversation on June 6 between Kissinger and Argentine Foreign Minister Admiral César Augusto Guzzetti. When Guzzetti asked for U.S. understanding and support, Kissinger replied, “We wish the new

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6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
government well. … We will do what we can to help it succeed.” Their conversation marked the start of the actualization of America’s plans to keep in contact with the junta and discreetly support them. At that point, the White House had wholly decided to support the right-wing government in its attempts to subvert leftist politics in the realm of U.S. influence.

Consequently, with few diplomatic efforts made at reducing human rights violations, the GOA continued to ignore the pressing issue. A report made in mid-July of 1978—the only one known to be made by Argentine military intelligence itself—consisted of a document secretly sent to Chile’s Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA) headquarters by an undercover Chilean intelligence official. He was allowed to examine records in the headquarters of the Army Intelligence Battalion 601 (the special military intelligence service of the junta) and estimated that 22,000 people had either died or disappeared by the hands of the military regime from 1975 until that point. The Ford Administration’s communist containment policy thus had palpably detrimental effects.

The policy of détente Ford adhered to outwardly stated that the U.S. would move away from using hardline force to deter communism; however, it also hid the backstage efforts to indirectly limit communist influences before they had a chance to take hold. The USG’s focus on supporting left-suppressing movements in its sphere of influence meant it was willing to knowingly ignore human rights violations to secure itself against communist ideals.

Under the Carter Administration

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10 It’s worth noting here that the actual number of the entire Dirty War should be extrapolated, as the killings and disappearances continued on for several more years.
When President Jimmy Carter came into office, he redirected foreign policy towards human rights issues around the world. Believing that past administrations had mistakenly placed their focus on Cold War containment, he was especially active in promoting human rights in Latin American countries, including Argentina. On September 1, 1978, the White House drafted a document that outlined ways to crack down on the junta over its human rights issues. In addition to offering incentives for good behavior, the USG placed punishments on the GOA for continued human rights violations. For instance, it decided that 101 requests worth approximately $25 million for Foreign Military Sales letters of authorization would “not be acted upon unless there is positive movement in the human rights area in Argentina.” Evidently, the punitive actions taken by the Carter Administration to fight for human rights present a rare example of the U.S. superseding its Cold War policies with another foreign policy, even before the Cold War had ended. However, it is not as if the U.S. was unaware of the communist influences taking hold of Argentina. In July 1978, a daily brief for Carter revealed that the Argentinians were “obviously posturing to some extent about strengthening relations with Communist nations.” Even though the conservative, suppressive GOA precluded any close diplomacy with the Soviets, Carter’s administration predicted that its willingness to turn to Communists for economic reasons (as the USSR had expressed strong interests in exports to Argentina) would likely increase if the U.S. withheld money for its exports to the nation.

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11 He ended the supply of military and economic aid to the Somoza family regime in Nicaragua in response to reports of human rights violations. The Somoza family was an autocratic family dictatorship that lasted for several decades in Nicaragua. It was closely tied to the U.S. and actively eliminated political opponents.


Nonetheless, the U.S. maintained a policy of economic detachment from Argentina until human rights conditions were satisfactory.

America also issued ultimatums to the Argentine government for better observance of human rights. In a 1978 report detailing Under Secretary Newsom’s May visit to Argentina, Newsom made it clear to the Argentinians that “our basic concern was for the rights of the person” and stated the U.S. would only respond if the junta made progress in any of three areas: reaching an agreement with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) for them to visit Argentina; trying, releasing, or allowing exile for the 3500 prisoners held without charge at the time; and creating a procedure to inform the families of the disappeared of their fate. As a part of his global, overarching foreign policy goal of human rights protection at the time, Carter visibly made concrete contributions to this cause, such as creating the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. He also terminated military aid distributed to countries such as Chile and Brazil, both of which were ruled by military dictators whom President Carter criticized.

Eventually, thanks in no small part to the extensive efforts of the Carter Administration, disappearances by the Argentine junta decreased over the span of the next few years and slowed to a trickle in the 1980s. In a retrospective report made in April 1985, several major human rights events during the war were identified. For instance, on October 17 of 1978, the GOA announced that the IAHRC had been invited to Argentina. In early 1979, preliminary evidence suggested there was a decrease in violations of category one rights (i.e., civil rights) with few reports of disappearances or torture having been received. Also, in March 1979, the local

14 Memorandum from Robert Pastor to David Aaron and Zbigniew Brzezinski, August 9, 1978.
15 Leaders such as Augusto Pinochet of Chile and Ernesto Geisel of Brazil were criticized. Both of them led their respective countries under a military regime.
17 Memorandum from Robert Pastor to David Aaron and Zbigniew Brzezinski, August 9, 1978.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) representative stated that prison conditions had clearly improved and that “he expected further improvements … because government officials now seemed to want the improvements.” Unsurprisingly, the transition from Cold War containment strategies to a more humanitarian foreign policy helped create a marked change in the lives of thousands of Argentinian civilians.

A Less Dirty Future

Although the backdrop for the USG’s activity during the Dirty War remained the same, namely, intelligence and influence over Latin American countries, the change in administration from Gerald Ford to Jimmy Carter marked a dramatic change in the attitude toward the issue of human rights in Argentina. Although the Carter administration did not break off its ties with the Argentine dictatorship, it did impose explicit expectations of human rights adherence in exchange for continued military and economic aid. This diplomatic style of incentivized goals and subtle punishments, rather than strict ultimatums, helped ensure that the U.S. and Argentina would maintain an amicable relationship that would extend into the 21st century.

In 2016, President Barack Obama and Argentine President Mauricio Macri agreed to begin declassifying records on both sides related to the human rights violations committed during the Dirty War. The first tranche of these records was released in April 2016, followed by another in December 2016, and so on, until the final batch was released in April 2019. By the end, over 7,500 records containing some 47,000 pages of secret U.S. intelligence files had been made public in what was the largest government-to-government transfer of declassified materials.

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in American history. At the March 24, 2016 commemoration for the 40th anniversary of the Dirty War, Obama argued, “I believe we have a responsibility to confront the past with honesty and transparency.”

His officials agreed, explaining that the Obama Administration held a desire to openly reflect on America’s past actions in Latin America. President Macri also claimed that the declassified documents would “be essential for there to be justice in past cases … from one of the darkest periods of Argentina’s history.” For example, there surfaced a report on General Saurez Mason, one of the arrested senior military officers, stating that “he had signed ‘fifty to a hundred death warrants per day’.” This document played a vital role in his eventual prosecution and conviction—reports such as these have thus been instrumental in fulfilling Macri’s vision.

As of 2017, 2,979 people had been tried for the crimes they committed under the regime with the help of the declassified documents. With such progress made between Obama and Macri, there is greater room for the pursuit of truth and justice in both this instance and extensions of it. As a whole, the efforts of these two presidents may pave a way for the human rights movement in Argentina and around the world. Individually, the records and promises made regarding the atrocities committed during the Dirty War can encourage people, especially those affected, to find solace in the hope that similar tragedies will not occur in the future.

As a historical lesson, this example of “dirty diplomacy” helps shed light on the complicated and somewhat misunderstood topic of controversial U.S. foreign policy decisions during the Cold War. The records of America’s involvement in the Dirty War revealed that,

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23 Ibid.

although the U.S. proclaimed to follow a policy of détente, it nonetheless continued with containment policies when leftist political groups began to threaten a Communist presence close to home.
Primary Sources

Disclaimer: To clarify, the reason why there are so few primary sources is because each one is a collection of hundreds, if not thousands, of small primary documents, such as letters, memos, briefing notes, etc. I sifted through hundreds of these to select the few presented in this paper, but I did not include each one in the bibliography.


This source provided for a huge collection of declassified documents. Many of these documents were after 1977, which meant I was able to use them to analyze the Carter’s Administration’s diplomacy regarding human rights. Overall, they illustrated a much stronger emphasis placed on influencing the junta’s handling of human rights.


This source provided some primary accounts of specific groups of people who disappeared, were detained, tortured, or worse. One document was used as an example of how the documents could retrospectively be used for justice after having been declassified.


This source was a collection of some additional CIA documents that helped give insight into the secret conversations the different presidential administrations had regarding the human rights situation.

This source was a collection of many primary sources reviewed in this paper. The documents included all describe interactions within the White House, with most of them focusing on conversations that took place while Gerald Ford was the president.


This source provided several massive collections of primary sources ranging from memos to presidential daily briefings. The collections were stratified by the president (divided into Ford, Carter, Reagan, and GHW Bush), making it easy to compare and contrast the contents of each.


This source provided many documents related to meetings within the White House between U.S. officials. Many of them illustrated differences of opinion on the issue of human rights.


This source provided some documents recounting meetings between the U.S. government and the junta, specifically, between Henry Kissinger and Admiral Guzzetti. It illustrated the messages the Ford Administration communicated to the Argentine government.
Secondary Sources


This source was used to reveal the motivations behind the foreign policy of Gerald Ford. It gives context into the actions that Gerald Ford took as the president regarding foreign policy. The examples all centered on how Ford pursued détente policies in most areas of the world away from the United States.


This source provides some additional related information around the Dirty War and some niche examples of conversations and diplomatic exchanges around it, as well as specific examples of reports and memos. The information that was used from this source was the examples of how the declassification records have helped affected families and the justice system review the Dirty War and the crimes committed during it.


This source was used to find some motivations behind Obama’s declassification project. It also helped explain the extent of the declassification project.


This website provided lots of information related to the different policies of the two different administrations, with specific examples of their policies in action. It provided a nice context for the administrations’ respective actions.

This news article gave insight into some of the implications of the declassification project, as well as the government’s incentives and motivations for initiating it.


This news article gives insight into how crucial the declassification project was, as well as some of its future implications. It focuses mainly on Obama’s starting of the project.


This wiki source provided some information that was included in the introduction of this paper. It also helped give context for the events that occurred throughout the entire period, and after it.


This page gave insightful information into the foreign policy of Ford, including some quotes from him and examples of what he did in specific historical events. The source helped develop the idea that, while Ford maintained Nixon’s policy of détente in areas of the world farther from the U.S., he returned to containment-like policies in Latin America.


This news article helped contextualize the history of U.S. intervention in Latin America. It also goes more into depth about the results of the declassification project with regards to how it has helped bring people to justice.


This news article helps provide an understanding of Carter’s adherence to human rights in his foreign policy. It gave insight using White House meeting memos to describe the Carter Administration’s policy on human rights.