

THE WHITE HOUSE
HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

CLASSROOM | *Primary Documents*

Provoked by Pearl Harbor

The White House Meetings of FDR and Churchill : December, 1941

President Franklin D. Roosevelt called Sunday, December 7, 1941, a day that would “live in infamy,” for on that day the Empire of Japan launched a surprise attack against the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. Within a day the United States was at war with Japan, and only three days later with Japan’s Axis allies, Germany and Italy. Great Britain, only recently having come under the leadership of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, had been at war with Germany and Italy since September 1939. In that time the United States, though largely isolationist in its sentiments, had become the great “arsenal of democracy,” aiding Britain through the Lend-Lease program.

Now, in an instant, Japan’s raid at Pearl Harbor had mobilized the America people to war. As Roosevelt told Churchill, “We are all in the same boat now.” Almost immediately upon hearing of the air attack, Churchill made plans for a trip to Washington to meet face to face with President Roosevelt and his military chiefs. Churchill’s primary focus was to gain solid support for a “Germany first” military strategy. Nevertheless, the two leaders, in many formal and informal meetings at the White House, honed a concept they had first set down in the Atlantic Charter (August 1941) that had proposed a set of principles for international cooperation in maintaining world peace. The resulting Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, had 26 signatories, including the Soviet Union. The commitment of these signatories to the Declaration’s principles would soon be tested in the crucible of World War II.



Objectives:

The student will:


1. Understand the significance of the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1942 as an antecedent document to the development of the United Nations charter.
2. Consider an application of the principles set down in the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by the United Nations to actions involving its signatories.
3. Discover and imagine ways in which close personal contact between President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill shaped the actions of both leaders in the early days of World War II.

Background

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, Winston Churchill was dining at his home with U.S. envoy Averell Harriman and Ambassador John Winant. The radio was on, and the three men were suddenly jolted to attention by the announcement of the newscaster that the Japanese, Axis allies of Germany and Italy, had attacked Pearl Harbor. Churchill was on the phone immediately to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, asking for confirmation. "It's quite true," FDR said. The prime minister, whose country had endured 17 months of lonely fighting, knew immediately the implications of this attack, noting later that, "I did not pretend to have measured accurately the martial might of Japan, but now at this very moment I knew the United States was in the war, up to the neck, and in to the death. So we had won after all! . . . Great Britain would live Once again in our long island history we should emerge, however mauled or mutilated, safe and victorious."



Churchill and Roosevelt holding a press conference at the White House on December 23, 1941. Courtesy Franklin D. Roosevelt Library



The Queens' Bedroom on the second floor of the White House as it looks today. Churchill stayed in this room on his visit. WHHA



Within days, Churchill was aboard the Duke of York steaming toward the United States and a meeting with the president, much needed according to Churchill because “The whole plan of the Anglo-American defense and attack has to be concerted in the light of reality.” During the eight-day voyage Churchill was busily preparing three papers that he would present to President Roosevelt outlining his view of how the war should be fought. This was not their first meeting - that had been in August 1941 when they rendezvoused aboard a ship anchored off the coast of Newfoundland. There the leaders of beleaguered Great Britain and the neutral United States had set down the Atlantic Charter, guiding principles intended to govern the relationships among nations when peace came. Neither a treaty requiring Senate approval nor a state paper, it seemed a thinly disguised statement of war aims, including a call for “the final destruction of Nazi tyranny.”

On December 22, as Churchill and his chiefs of staff spent their first evening in the White House, the circumstances were quite different. The prime minister would stay longer than the one week he had first anticipated. In fact, he did not leave the White House until January 14, 1942, with an intervening two-day trip to Ottawa to give a speech, and a week’s rest in Palm Beach, Florida. The series of meetings of the two leaders, along with their cabinet-level and military advisors, was code-named “Arcadia,” a word meaning “any real or imagined place offering peace and simplicity.” Their work was anything but simple, but whatever decisions Churchill and Roosevelt would make during these White House discussions, they were now backed by the weight of war declarations of their respective countries.

With Churchill’s arrival, the upstairs hall of the White House became, as Roosevelt’s closest advisor, Harry Hopkins, called it, “the headquarters of the British Empire,” complete with a temporary map room. During the prime minister’s stay at the Executive Mansion, there were eight major meetings of the president, prime minister, secretaries of war and navy, the British and American chiefs of staff, and Harry Hopkins. As Churchill noted, “intense activity reigned.” The first business of the two leaders was the formation of a “grand alliance of the Allies.” The two leaders would draw up a solemn declaration to be signed by all nations at war with Germany. Churchill and FDR, as they had done with the Atlantic Charter, drew up separate drafts of what was tentatively called a “Declaration of Associated Powers” and blended them together through discussion. There was rapid-fire correspondence between the War Cabinet in London and Washington as differences arose with regard to certain words or phrases. Nevertheless, despite these difficult points, compromises were struck.

On January 1, 1942, representatives of 26 Allied nations signed the “Declaration by the United Nations.” Pledging to support the Atlantic Charter, these signatories agreed to commit their full resources to the defeat of the Axis powers, promised to make no separate peace, and agreed to preserve idealistic virtues such as freedom and justice. Some would later say that this signing was the birth of the United Nations. At a time when the Germans controlled the European continent and the Japanese were sweeping across Guam, Wake Island, Hong Kong, Malaya and the Philippines, the Declaration provided millions with an uplifting message of hope.



For Discussion

1. Make copies of the Atlantic Charter (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/wwii.asp) and the Declaration by the United Nations (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade03.asp)

Ask students to read the Declaration and notice that its signatories agreed to subscribe to “the purposes and principles of the Atlantic Charter.” Have students read the Atlantic Charter and make a list of its declarations. Discuss the following: What would it take from a military perspective to guarantee to all nations the conditions set down in the Charter? If the Charter resulted in the establishment of “a wider and permanent system of general security,” which signatories would most likely have the burden of sustaining that security?

Which countries would benefit most from a “wider and permanent system of security”? When certain nations declare in such a document that something is essential - disarming aggressor nations, for example - does it necessarily follow that those nations must do something about it? How would isolationists groups such as “America First” feel about this Declaration?

2. Have students examine Roosevelt’s handwritten list (**SEE Image on PG.5**) of Declaration signatories and note the changes that he made. Before revising this list he received advice from Harry Hopkins, his most trusted aide and confidante. Hopkins advised him that if the list of named countries was to be a long one, he thought it should include all of them, stating that he saw a distinct advantage in “having a long list of countries join us.” Ask students to consider these questions: What would be the advantage of this long list? Hopkins also suggested to Roosevelt that certain countries like China and the USSR should be “lifted out of their alphabetical listing and placed with our own and the U.K.” Why would Hopkins have made this particular distinction? Ask student to compare Roosevelt’s handwritten list to the final Declaration. Did the president follow Hopkins’s advice? Why is the United States listed first, rather than Great Britain?

3. On January 6, 1941, in his Annual Message to Congress, President Roosevelt spoke of a future world founded upon four essential human freedoms: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of every person to worship God in his own way, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. Though three of these seemed embodied in the language of the Atlantic Charter, many criticized the document because it did not include a reference to religious freedom. In the Declaration by the United Nations, Roosevelt sought to remedy this omission.


During the Declaration discussions, while the president was meeting with Soviet Prime Minister Maxim Litvinov, Churchill, and Hopkins, he made the point that he wished to add a reference to religious freedom in the document. The Soviet minister said that he thought the Kremlin might agree to a term such as “freedom of conscience,” but not the word “religion.” Invite students to consider this question: Why might one expect the Soviets to object to the word “religion”? Roosevelt made the argument that the traditional Jeffersonian principle of religious freedom was so broad that it included the right to have no religion at all. Invite students to consider the meaning of the terms “freedom of conscience” and “freedom of religion.” Ask them whether or not they believe both terms are broad enough to include the right to hold religious beliefs? Have students re-read the Declaration to see if Roosevelt’s idea prevailed.



4. Ask students to read the document that features Russia's amendments (**SEE Image on PG.6**) to the Declaration recorded in Roosevelt's own handwriting. Ask students to consider why this is by Roosevelt's pen, rather than a secretary's. What might this suggest about the level of intimacy established between Litvinov and Roosevelt?

5. At the time of the Declaration by the United Nations, the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan. Have students read item one of the Declaration (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade03.asp). Discuss the following: Does the sentence in item one commit the Soviet Union to make war against all members of the Tripartite Pact? Why would it have been particularly difficult for the Soviet Union to join the war against Japan at this time?

6. The last editing change in the Declaration made by Roosevelt was to substitute the words 'United Nations' for "Associated Powers." In a telegram to a cabinet member, Winston Churchill stated: "President has chosen the title 'United Nations' for all the Powers now working together. This is much better than 'Alliance' which places him in constitutional difficulties, or 'Associated Powers,' which is flat." Discuss the following: Why does the term "Alliance" cause constitutional problems? What advantage does the term "United Nations" have over "Associated Powers." Is the only difference "flatness?"



JOINT DECLARATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
CHINA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS, AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, CANADA, COSTA RICA,
CUBA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, EL SALVADOR,
GREECE, GUATEMALA, HAITI, HONDURAS, NETHERLANDS,
NEW ZEALAND, NICARAGUA, NORWAY, PANAMA, POLAND,
SOUTH AFRICA, AND YUGOSLAVIA.

The Governments signatory hereto,

Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter,

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice ^(not only in their own lands as will as in other lands) but everywhere) and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world, DECLARE:

~~(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite and its adherents with which such government is at war.~~
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(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite and its adherents with which such government is at war.

~~(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the other Governments signatory hereto; and to continue war against, and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the common enemies or any of them.~~
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(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the other Governments signatory hereto; and to continue war against, and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the common enemies or any of them.

The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions towards the defeat of members or adherents of the Tripartite Pact.



Bibliography and Links

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United Nations | <http://www.un.org>

The Avalon Project at the Yale Law School | <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/>

National History Standards

This lesson meets the following National History Standards for United States history, Grades 5-12:

Evaluate the wartime aims and strategies hammered out at conferences among the Allied powers. [Hypothesize the influence of the past.] (Era 8: The Great Depression and World War II (1929-1945), Standard 3C.)

Explain the purposes and organization of the United Nations. [Marshal evidence of antecedent circumstances.] (Era 8: Standard 3B.)

Evaluate the implementation of a decision by analyzing the interests it served; estimating the position, power, and priority of each player involved; assessing the ethical dimensions of the decision; and evaluating its costs and benefits from a variety of perspectives. (Historical Thinking, Standard 5.)

Appreciate historical perspectives, describing the past on its own terms, through the eyes and experiences of those who were there, as revealed through their . . . diaries, letters, debates . . . and the like. (Historical Thinking, Standard 2)



Activities: I. The Atlantic Charter and the Origins of the United Nations

1. According to Robert Sherwood in Hopkins and Roosevelt, the British government never regarded the Atlantic Charter as a formal State Paper. Sherwood states that, “It was, to them, not much more than a publicity handout. Roosevelt, who took it much more seriously, was compelled to foster this belief by insisting that it could not be considered as in any way a Treaty; if it had been, he should have had to submit it to the Senate for ratification.”

Ask students to read excerpts from Winston Churchill’s *The Grand Alliance* (**SEE PG.10**) relating to the question of the Soviet Union’s territorial ambitions in the Baltic States. Have them collect evidence that: (A) Churchill took the language of the charter very seriously; and (B) he believes that Roosevelt considers it an important commitment. Have students present their evidence to the class.

As a parallel assignment, ask other students to research the political fate of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania at the end of World War II, and their political, social, and economic circumstances today. Encourage students to write the UN offices of these three countries to gain specific material about each their recent histories. Ask this group of students to assess the validity of Churchill’s concerns in 1941-42.

After students have presented Churchill’s concerns at the beginning of the war, and have brought the class up to date on current conditions in these three countries, ask them to write a “Progress Report” on the Baltic States, and to imagine that Winston Churchill would receive it. Encourage them to emphasize the degree to which the political environment in those three countries reflects the ideals of the Atlantic Charter. Ask them to include a prediction about what they think is likely to happen in that part of the former Soviet Union in the next few years.

2. One outcome of the Arcadia Conference was the formulation of the Declaration by the United Nations. Ask students to conduct research on other conferences of World War II and report to the class on what major decisions were reached by the Allies at these meetings. As students present their findings, generate a list of these decisions on the board or overhead. Ask students to decide whether that action helped (+) or hindered (-) the efforts of the Allies to move toward the goals of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by the United Nations.

3. Ask students to develop an evolutionary chart on the development of the United Nations. Have them begin with the charter of the League of Nations (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp) then include the Atlantic Charter (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/wwii.asp) and the Declaration by the United Nations (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade03.asp) and finally the United Nations Charter of 1945 (<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/unchart.htm>). Invite them to consider categories such as these: primary objectives; signatory nations and their relative power; organizing structure; binding financial and military commitments. After students analyze the chart and its results, ask them to write generalizations about the influence of early efforts at collective security on the mission, make-up, and structure of the current United Nations.

As a parallel assignment ask several students to compare the Atlantic Charter to Franklin Roosevelt’s Annual Message to Congress, January 6, 1941 (**SEE PG.13**). Have them present their findings to the class, stating in what ways the two documents seem related.



4. Divide the class into two groups. Ask each group to assess the validity of this statement made by Churchill to his Foreign Secretary on January 8, 1942:

“No one can foresee how the balance of power will lie or where the winning armies will stand at the end of the war. It seems probable however that the United States and the British Empire, far from being exhausted, will be the most powerfully armed and economic[ally strong] bloc the world has ever seen, and that the Soviet Union will need our aid for reconstruction far more we shall then need theirs.”

Students will arrive at their conclusions through research. Ask one group to focus their study on the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union in 1948. Ask the other students to concentrate their efforts on the current situation in these three countries. Have students present their findings either in a class discussion or an essay.

5. Ask students to represent artistically the ideals and goals of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by the United Nations. Create a display of that work.

6. Have students visit the United Nations website (<http://www.un.org/>). Ask students to conduct research on any action taken by the United Nations since 1945; for example, UN assisted elections in Mozambique, October 1994. Ask students to study the history of that country further to discover what circumstances prompted a UN intervention. After the research is complete, ask each student to write a United Nations Day (October 24) editorial from the perspective of that country and take a stand on the power and relevancy of the United Nations in that region.

7. Roosevelt’s ideas for re-ordering the signatories of the Declaration by the United Nations prevailed, so that the top four were the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China. To review, click on the handwritten list (**SEE PG.5**). When the United Nations was organized these four countries, plus France, made up the permanent members of a 15-nation UN Security Council. Ask one group of students to conduct research to define the role of the United Nations Security Council. Ask another group to determine how China has changed politically since the end of World War II, while other students research what has happened to the political structure of the USSR. Have students provide at least two examples in which these changes have complicated the “great Power unanimity” concept, (the rule that all five of these powers must agree), and the international peacekeeping role of the Council. If time permits, let students prepare a Security Council meeting in which one of these examples is debated. Have students role-play representatives of the entire Security Council, including non-permanent members. The students should debate and vote from their assigned nations’ political perspectives.

8. Ask students to imagine that Franklin Roosevelt could sit in on a session of the United Nations General Assembly today. Invite them to find imaginative ways to describe how they think Roosevelt might view this organization, which is an outgrowth of his ideas. Share these creative products with the class.



Activities: I. The Atlantic Charter and the Origins of the United Nations

British-Soviet Relations

Even before the United States declared war on Germany and Japan, Great Britain and the Soviet Union were waging war against Hitler. The Soviets had entered the war in June 1941 when Germany invaded the U.S.S.R. . Though fighting the same enemy, relations between Great Britain and the Soviets were complicated. In late November 1941 Winston Churchill saw the need to send British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden to Moscow. His goal: to open conversations between the two countries on war aims, plans for the post-war organization of peace, and the details of mutual military assistance.

As Winston Churchill traveled by sea to the United States in the days just after the attack on Pearl Harbor, he kept up a steady correspondence by telegram with important political and military members of the British government, especially Anthony Eden, who by this time was in Moscow for meetings with Soviet premier, Joseph Stalin, and his ministers.

On January 5, 1942 Churchill received a report from Eden, which read, in part:

In the second conversation, on December 17, M. Stalin pressed for the immediate recognition by His Majesty's Government of the future frontiers of the U.S.S.R., more particularly in regard to the inclusion with the U.S.S.R. of the Baltic States and the restoration of the 1941 Finnish-Soviet frontier. He made the conclusion of any Anglo-Soviet Agreement dependent on agreement on this point. I, for my part, explained to M. Stalin that in view of our prior undertakings to the United States Government it was quite impossible for His Majesty's Government to commit themselves at this stage to any post-war frontiers in Europe, although I undertook to consult His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the United States Government, and His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions on my return. This question, to which M. Stalin attached fundamental importance, was further discussed at the third meeting on December 18.

Churchill later recalled, "In the forefront of the Russian claims [as reflected in Eden's report] was the request that the Baltic States, which Russia had subjugated at the beginning of the war, should be finally incorporated in the Soviet Union." He recorded his feelings about this possibility, saying: "As soon as I read the telegrams I reacted violently against the absorption of the Baltic States."

To British cabinet member, Clement R. Attlee, Churchill wrote on December 20, 1941:

Stalin's demand about Finland, Baltic States, and Roumania are directly contrary to the first, second, and third articles of the Atlantic Charter, to which Stalin has subscribed. There can be no question whatever of our making such an agreement, secret or public, direct or implied, without prior agreement with the U.S. The time has not yet come to settle frontier questions which can only be resolved at the Peace Conference when we have won the war.

The mere desire to have an agreement which can be published should never lead us into making wrongful promises. Foreign Secretary has acquitted himself admirably, and should not be downhearted if he has to leave Moscow without any flourish of trumpets. The Russians have got to go on fighting for their lives anyway, and are dependent upon us for very large supplies, which we have most painfully gathered, and which we shall faithfully deliver. I hope the Cabinet will agree to communicate the above to the Foreign Secretary. He will no doubt act with the necessary tact and discretion, but should know decisively where we stand.



*In early January 1942, while still visiting in the United States, Winston Churchill's concerns about the Soviet Union remained. In this passage from *The Grand Alliance* he recalls those concerns, and includes a copy of a letter he sent to Foreign Minister Eden about this matter:*

I was much disturbed by the reports which Mr. Eden had brought back with him from Moscow of Soviet territorial ambitions, especially in the Baltic States. These were the conquests of Peter the Great, and had been for two hundred years under the Czars. Since the Russian revolution they had been the outpost of Europe against Bolshevism. They were what are now called "social democracies," but very lively and truculent. Hitler had cast them away like pawns in his deal with the Soviets before the outbreak of war in 1939. There had been a severe Russian and Communist purge. All the dominant personalities and elements had been liquidated in one way or another. The life of these strong peoples was henceforward underground. Presently, as we shall see, Hitler came back with a Nazi counter-purge, the deadly comb ran back and forth, and back again, through Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. There was no doubt however where the right lay. The Baltic States should be sovereign independent peoples.

Letter of Churchill to Foreign Minister Eden, January 8, 1942:

We have never recognized the 1941 frontiers of Russia except de facto. They were acquired by acts of aggression in shameful collusion with Hitler. The transfer of the peoples of the Baltic States to Soviet Russia against their will would be contrary to all the principles for which we are fighting this war and would dishonour our cause. This also applies to Bessarabia and to Northern Bukovina, and in a lesser degree to Finland, which I gather it is not intended wholly to subjugate and absorb.

Russia could, upon strategical grounds, make a case for the approaches to Leningrad, which the Finns have utilised to attack her. There are islands in the Baltic which may be essential to the safety of Russia. Strategical security may be invoked at certain points on the frontiers of Bukovina or Bessarabia. In these cases the population would have to be offered evacuation and compensation if they desired it. In all other cases transference of territory must be regulated after the war is over by freely and fairly conducted plebiscites, very differently from what is suggested. In any case there can be no questions of settling frontiers until the Peace Conference. I know President Roosevelt holds this view as strongly as I do, and he has several times expressed his pleasure to me at the firm line we took at Moscow. I could not be an advocate for a British Cabinet bent on such a course.

I regard our sincerity to be involved in the maintenance of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which Stalin has subscribed. On this also we depend on our association with the United States. . . .

About the effect on Russia of our refusal to prejudice the peace negotiations at this stage in the war, or to depart from the principles of the Atlantic Charter, it must be observed that they entered the war only when attacked by Germany, having previously shown themselves utterly indifferent to our fate, and indeed they added to our burdens in our worst danger. Their armies have fought very bravely and have shown immense unsuspected strength in the defence of their native soil. They are fighting for self-preservation and have never had a thought for us. We, on the contrary, are helping them to the utmost of our ability because we admire their defence of their own country and because they are ranged against Hitler.



No one can foresee how the balance of power will lie or where the winning armies will stand at the end of the war. It seems probable however that the United States and the British Empire, far from being exhausted, will be the most powerfully armed and economic bloc the world has ever seen, and that the Soviet Union will need our aid for reconstruction far more than we shall then need theirs.

You have promised that we will examine these claims of Russia in common with the United States and the Dominions. That promise we must keep. But there must be no mistake about the opinion of any British Government of which I am the head, namely, that it adheres to those principles of freedom and democracy set forth in the Atlantic Charter, and that these principles must become especially active whenever any question of transferring territory is raised. I conceive therefore that our answer should be that all questions of territorial frontiers must be left to the decision of the Peace Conference. Juridically this is how the matter stands now.

[Source: *The Grand Alliance*, pp. 558-559, 615-616]



President Franklin D. Roosevelt | Annual message to the Congress, the Capitol, Washington, D. C.

January 6, 1941

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Seventy-seventh Congress

I address you, the Members of the Seventy-seventh Congress, at a moment unprecedented in the history of the Union. I use the word “unprecedented,” because at no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today.

Since the permanent formation of our Government under the Constitution, in 1789, most of the periods of crisis in our history have related to our domestic affairs. Fortunately, only one of these—the four-year War Between the States—ever threatened our national unity. Today, thank God, one hundred and thirty million Americans, in forty-eight States, have forgotten points of the compass in our national unity.

It is true that prior to 1914 the United States often had been disturbed by events in other Continents. We had even engaged in two wars with European nations and in a number of undeclared wars in the West Indies, in the Mediterranean and in the Pacific for the maintenance of American rights and for the principles of peaceful commerce. But in no case had a serious threat been raised against our national safety or our continued independence.

What I seek to convey is the historic truth that the United States as a nation has at all times maintained clear, definite opposition, to any attempt to lock us in behind an ancient Chinese wall while the procession of civilization went past. Today, thinking of our children and of their children, we oppose enforced isolation for ourselves or for any other part of the Americas.

That determination of ours, extending over all these years, was proved, for example, during the quarter century of wars following the French Revolution.

While the Napoleonic struggles did threaten interests of the United States because of the French foothold in the West Indies and in Louisiana, and while we engaged in the War of 1812 to vindicate our right to peaceful trade, it is nevertheless clear that neither France nor Great Britain, nor any other nation, was aiming at domination of the whole world.

In like fashion from 1815 to 1914—ninety-nine years—no single war in Europe or in Asia constituted a real threat against our future or against the future of any other American nation.

Except in the Maximilian interlude in Mexico, no foreign power sought to establish itself in this Hemisphere; and the strength of the British fleet in the Atlantic has been a friendly strength. It is still a friendly strength.

Even when the World War broke out in 1914, it seemed to contain only small threat of danger to our own American future. But, as time went on, the American people began to visualize what the downfall of democratic nations might mean to our own democracy.



We need not overemphasize imperfections in the Peace of Versailles. We need not harp on failure of the democracies to deal with problems of world reconstruction. We should remember that the Peace of 1919 was far less unjust than the kind of “pacification” which began even before Munich, and which is being carried on under the new order of tyranny that seeks to spread over every continent today. The American people have unalterably set their faces against that tyranny.

Every realist knows that the democratic way of life is at this moment being directly assailed in every part of the world—assailed: either by arms, or by secret spreading of poisonous propaganda by those who seek to destroy unity and promote discord in nations that are still at peace.

During sixteen long months this assault has blotted out the whole pattern of democratic life in an appalling number of independent nations, great and small. The assailants are still on the march, threatening other nations, great and small.

Therefore, as your President, performing my constitutional duty to “give to the Congress information of the state of the Union,” I find it, unhappily, necessary to report that the future and the safety of our country and of our democracy are overwhelmingly involved in events far beyond our borders.

Armed defense of democratic existence is now being gallantly waged in four continents. If that defense fails, all the population and all the resources of Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia will be dominated by the conquerors. Let us remember that the total of those populations and their resources in those four continents greatly exceeds the sum total of the population and the resources of the whole of the Western Hemisphere—many times over.

In times like these it is immature—and incidentally, untrue—for anybody to brag that an unprepared America, single-handed, and with one hand tied behind its back, can hold off the whole world.

No realistic American can expect from a dictator’s peace international generosity, or return of true independence, or world disarmament, or freedom of expression, or freedom of religion—or even good business.

Such a peace would bring no security for us or for our neighbors. “Those, who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.”

As a nation, we may take pride in the fact that we are softhearted; but we cannot afford to be soft-headed.

We must always be wary of those who with sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal preach the “ism” of appeasement.

We must especially beware of that small group of selfish men who would clip the wings of the American eagle in order to feather their own nests.

I have recently pointed out how quickly the tempo of modern warfare could bring into our very midst the physical attack which we must eventually expect if the dictator nations win this war.



There is much loose talk of our immunity from immediate and direct invasion from across the seas. Obviously, as long as the British Navy retains its power, no such danger exists. Even if there were no British Navy, it is not probable that any enemy would be stupid enough to attack us by landing troops in the United States from across thousands of miles of ocean, until it had acquired strategic bases from which to operate.

But we learn much from the lessons of the past years in Europe-particularly the lesson of Norway, whose essential seaports were captured by treachery and surprise built up over a series of years.

The first phase of the invasion of this Hemisphere would not be the landing of regular troops. The necessary strategic points would be occupied by secret agents and their dupes-and great numbers of them are already here, and in Latin America.

As long as the aggressor nations maintain the offensive, they-not we-will choose the time and the place and the method of their attack.

That is why the future of all the American Republics is today in serious danger.

That is why this Annual Message to the Congress is unique in our history.

That is why every member of the Executive Branch of the Government and every member of the Congress faces great responsibility and great accountability.

The need of the moment is that our actions and our policy should be devoted primarily-almost exclusively-to meeting this foreign peril. For all our domestic problems are now a part of the great emergency.

Just as our national policy in internal affairs has been based upon a decent respect for the rights and the dignity of all our fellow men within our gates, so our national policy in foreign affairs has been based on a decent respect for the rights and dignity of all nations, large and small. And the justice of morality must and will win in the end.

Our national policy is this:

First, by an impressive expression of the public will and without regard to partisanship, we are committed to all-inclusive national defense.

Second, by an impressive expression of the public will and without regard to partisanship, we are committed to full support of all those resolute peoples, everywhere, who are resisting aggression and are thereby keeping war away from our Hemisphere. By this support, we express our determination that the democratic cause shall prevail; and we strengthen the defense and the security of our own nation.

Third, by an impressive expression of the public will and without regard to partisanship, we are committed to the proposition that principles of morality and considerations for our own security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers.

We know that enduring peace cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom.



In the recent national election there was no substantial difference between the two great parties in respect to that national policy. No issue was fought out on this line before the American electorate. Today it is abundantly evident that American citizens everywhere are demanding and supporting speedy and complete action in recognition of obvious danger.

Therefore, the immediate need is a swift and driving increase in our armament production.

Leaders of industry and labor have responded to our summons. Goals of speed have been set. In some cases these goals are being reached ahead of time; in some cases we are on schedule; in other cases there are slight but not serious delays; and in some cases—and I am sorry to say very important cases—we are all concerned by the slowness of the accomplishment of our plans.

The Army and Navy, however, have made substantial progress during the past year. Actual experience is improving and speeding up our methods of production with every passing day. And today's best is not good enough for tomorrow.

I am not satisfied with the progress thus far made. The men in charge of the program represent the best in training, in ability, and in patriotism. They are not satisfied with the progress thus far made. None of us will be satisfied until the job is done.

No matter whether the original goal was set too high or too low, our objective is quicker and better results.

To give you two illustrations:

We are behind schedule in turning out finished airplanes; we are working day and night to solve the innumerable problems and to catch up.

We are already of schedule in building warships but we are working to get even further ahead of that schedule.

To change a whole nation from a basis of peacetime production of implements of peace to a basis of wartime production of implements of war is no small task. And the greatest difficulty comes at the beginning of the program, when new tools, new plant facilities, new assembly lines, and new ship ways must first be constructed before the actual materiel begins to flow steadily and speedily from them.

The Congress, of course, must rightly keep itself informed at all times of the progress of the program. However, there is certain information, as the Congress itself will readily recognize, which, in the interests of our own security and those of the nations that we are supporting, must of needs be kept in confidence.

New circumstances are constantly begetting new needs for our safety. I shall ask this Congress for greatly increased new appropriations and authorizations to carry on what we have begun.

I also ask this Congress for authority and for funds sufficient to manufacture additional munitions and war supplies of many kinds, to be turned over to those nations which are now in actual war with aggressor nations.

Our most useful and immediate role is to act as an arsenal for them as well as for ourselves. They do not need man power, but they do need billions of dollars worth of the weapons of defense.



The time is near when they will not be able to pay for them all in ready cash. We cannot, and we will not, tell them that they must surrender, merely because of present inability to pay for the weapons which we know they must have.

I do not recommend that we make them a loan of dollars with which to pay for these weapons—a loan to be repaid in dollars.

I recommend that we make it possible for those nations to continue to obtain war materials in the United States, fitting their orders into our own program. Nearly all their materiel would, if the time ever came, be useful for our own defense.

Taking counsel of expert military and naval authorities, considering what is best for our own security, we are free to decide how much should be kept here and how much should be sent abroad to our friends who by their determined and heroic resistance are giving us time in which to make ready our own defense.

For what we send abroad, we shall be repaid within a reasonable time following the close of hostilities, in similar materials, or, at our option, in other goods of many kinds, which they can produce and which we need.

Let us say to the democracies: “We Americans are vitally concerned in your defense of freedom. We are putting forth our energies, our resources and our organizing powers to give you the strength to regain and maintain a free world. We shall send you, in ever-increasing numbers, ships, planes, tanks, guns. This is our purpose and our pledge.”

In fulfillment of this purpose we will not be intimidated by the threats of dictators that they will regard as a breach of international law or as an act of war our aid to the democracies which dare to resist their aggression. Such aid is not an act of war, even if a dictator should unilaterally proclaim it so to be.

When the dictators, if the dictators, are ready to make war upon us, they will not wait for an act of war on our part. They did not wait for Norway or Belgium or the Netherlands to commit an act of war.

Their only interest is in a new one-way international law, which lacks mutuality in its observance, and, therefore, becomes an instrument of oppression.

The happiness of future generations of Americans may well depend upon how effective and how immediate we can make our aid felt. No one can tell the exact character of the emergency situations that we may be called upon to meet. The Nation’s hands must not be tied when the Nation’s life is in danger.

We must all prepare to make the sacrifices that the emergency—almost as serious as war itself—demands. Whatever stands in the way of speed and efficiency in defense preparations must give way to the national need.

A free nation has the right to expect full cooperation from all groups. A free nation has the right to look to the leaders of business, of labor, and of agriculture to take the lead in stimulating effort, not among other groups but within their own groups.

The best way of dealing with the few slackers or trouble makers in our midst is, first, to shame them by patriotic example, and, if that fails, to use the sovereignty of Government to save Government.



As men do not live by bread alone, they do not fight by armaments alone. Those who man our defenses, and those behind them who build our defenses, must have the stamina and the courage which come from unshakable belief in the manner of life which they are defending. The mighty action that we are calling for cannot be based on a disregard of all things worth fighting for.

The Nation takes great satisfaction and much strength from the things which have been done to make its people conscious of their individual stake in the preservation of democratic life in America.

Those things have toughened the fibre of our people, have renewed their faith and strengthened their devotion to the institutions we make ready to protect.

Certainly this is no time for any of us to stop thinking about the social and economic problems which are the root cause of the social revolution which is today a supreme factor in the world.

For there is nothing mysterious about the foundations of a healthy and strong democracy. The basic things expected by our people of their political and economic systems are simple. They are: Equality of opportunity for youth and for others.

Jobs for those who can work.

Security for those who need it.

The ending of special privilege for the few.

|The preservation of civil liberties for all.

The enjoyment of the fruits of scientific progress in a wider and constantly rising standard of living.

These are the simple, basic things that must never be lost sight of in the turmoil and unbelievable complexity of our modern world. The inner and abiding strength of our economic and political systems is dependent upon the degree to which they fulfill these expectations.

Many subjects connected with our social economy call for immediate improvement.

As examples:

We should bring more citizens under the coverage of old-age pensions and unemployment insurance.

We should widen the opportunities for adequate medical care.

We should plan a better system by which persons deserving or needing gainful employment may obtain it.

I have called for personal sacrifice. I am assured of the willingness of almost all Americans to respond to that call.



A part of the sacrifice means the payment of more money in taxes. In my Budget Message I shall recommend that a greater portion of this great defense program be paid for from taxation than we are paying today. No person should try, or be allowed, to get rich out of this program; and the principle of tax payments in accordance with ability to pay should be constantly before our eyes to guide our legislation.

If the Congress maintains these principles, the voters, putting patriotism ahead of pocket-books, will give you their applause.

In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.

The first is freedom of speech and expression-everywhere in the world.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way-everywhere in the world.

The third is freedom from want-which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants-everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear-which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor-anywhere in the world.

That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation. That kind of world is the very antithesis of the so-called new order of tyranny which the dictators seek to create with the crash of a bomb.

To that new order we oppose the greater conception-the moral order. A good society is able to face schemes of world domination and foreign revolutions alike without fear.

Since the beginning of our American history, we have been engaged in change-in a perpetual peaceful revolution-a revolution which goes on steadily, quietly adjusting itself to changing conditions- without the concentration camp or the quick-lime in the ditch. The world order which we seek is the cooperation of free countries, working together in a friendly, civilized society.

This nation has placed its destiny in the hands and heads and hearts of its millions of free men and women; and its faith in freedom under the guidance of God. Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who struggle to gain those rights or keep them. Our strength is our unity of purpose.

To that high concept there can be no end save victory.



Activities: II. Inside the White House

When Winston Churchill visited the White House from December 22, 1941, through January 14, 1942, he stayed upstairs in the Rose Room, now known as the Queens' Bedroom. On January 3, 1942, he wrote home to Clement Attlee, a British cabinet minister: "We live here as a big family, in the greatest intimacy and informality, and I have formed the very highest regard and admiration for the President. His breadth of view, resolution, and his loyalty to the common cause are beyond all praise."

Ask students to read excerpts (**LISTED ON PG.21-22**) describing aspects of the relationship between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt and the circumstances that shaped the Arcadia meetings. Then have them complete one or more of the following activities:

1. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Churchill decided that he wanted to go to the United States to see President Roosevelt. As he said in his cable to Roosevelt, "I feel that all of these matters, some of which are causing me concern, can best be settled on the highest executive level." As was the custom for the prime minister, Churchill asked the permission of the king (George VI) to leave the country. It was granted. Ask students to compose a letter that Churchill might have written to the king upon prime minister's return to Great Britain. In the letter, ask them to make a case for the idea that the face-to-face contact between the two leaders had been beneficial to the war effort, including setting in place some firm ideas regarding a "lasting peace."

2. In writing to the king about his planned trip to America, Churchill expressed his fears: "We have also to be careful that our share of munitions and other aid which we are receiving from the United States does not suffer more than is, I fear, inevitable." Some critics of Churchill claimed that his visit to the White House and his subsequent relationship with Roosevelt were not genuine but rather based strictly on political and military expediency. Ask students to gather evidence from all of the documents presented here that Churchill held Roosevelt in high regard, that theirs was a relationship of mutual respect, admiration, and idealistic affinities. Ask students to incorporate their findings into seven or eight diary entries written from the perspective of either a family or staff member who would have been at the White House during Churchill's visit.

3. As excerpt "G" indicates, Franklin Roosevelt admired Churchill's "mobile Map Room" and had one created for the White House. Ask several students to research the Allied and Axis military situation in early 1942. Have them illustrate the theaters of action, using colored pins, on a world map. As a parallel assignment, ask other students to illustrate a world map showing how the military situation had changed by early 1945. After the maps are displayed, use them as a means of helping students write compare-and-contrast statements about the progress of the war.

4. In excerpt "H," Harry Hopkins noted differences in the methods Roosevelt and Churchill used in preparing speeches. Discuss this passage with students so they can better understand its meaning. After discussion, invite one group of students to read and analyze Roosevelt's Annual Message to the Congress, January 6, 1941 (**SEE PG.13**), and have another analyze Churchill's Message to the Congress, December 26, 1941 (**SEE PG.22**). Each group should examine the selected speech in the light of differences between the two leaders' styles, as noted in the excerpt. Have students relate their findings to the class, using specific passages from the two speeches to validate their points.



5. Robert Sherwood in *Roosevelt and Hopkins* noted, “Churchill was in the White House because he was the King’s First Minister, but he could not forget that he was also a professional historian who was most sensitive to the radiations of the past.” Engage the students in a discussion about historiography, the process or methods used to write history. Consider these questions: Might Churchill’s “sensitivity to the radiations of the past” have shaped his memory of President Roosevelt and the White House visit as described in his 1950 book, *The Grand Alliance*? How might the fact that Roosevelt died before the end of the war have influenced Churchill’s memory of his time with the president? What if, despite valiant efforts, the Grand Alliance had not won the war? Might an historian such as Churchill then view this period differently? Robert Sherwood worked in the Roosevelt administration as a speechwriter. How would that have affected his objectivity in writing a biography of Roosevelt and Hopkins? In what ways would his insider’s position strengthen his ability to tell the story? Doris Kearns Goodwin was a small child in the early 1940s. Would her view of these events necessarily be more objective? What is the value of a memoir such as the one written by Alonzo Fields? After the discussion, lead students to better comprehend the importance of reading history from a variety of perspectives.

Inside the White House: Excerpts

A. Roosevelt and Churchill, a first meeting. Even before the White House visit, Winston Churchill had met the president in August 1941 on the British ship, *Prince of Wales*, as it lay at anchor off the coast of Newfoundland. It was during this time that they prepared the Atlantic Charter. Robert Sherwood, the biographer of FDR advisor Harry Hopkins, shed light on the relationship that developed between the two leaders during these meetings. **(SEE PG.27)**

B. Churchill: His faith in America’s fighting spirit. Shortly after Winston Churchill heard the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he exulted in the knowledge that the United States would now be in the war, and that with the resulting military support, the British would win their fight against Hitler. He also offered his thinking about the character of the American people whose leader he was about to visit. **(SEE PG.28)**

C. Churchill: Preparing to meet with the president. As Churchill traveled aboard ship to the United States in December 1942, he prepared to meet the President by writing three papers on the future course of the war as he conceived it. In this passage, he explained his thinking. **(SEE PG.29)**

D. Churchill: His impressions of Roosevelt at the White House. Churchill arrived in the United States and flew from Hampton Roads, Virginia to Washington to begin his visit. In this segment, Churchill described some first impressions of Roosevelt, and how the relationship was strengthened as the leaders met at the White House. **(SEE PG.30)**

E. Churchill: The chief butler’s view. Alonzo Fields was the chief butler at the White House when Churchill visited. In his book Fields described his first impressions of the prime minister. **(SEE PG.31)**

F. Churchill at the White House: An insider’s view. Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s chief advisor, lived at the Executive Mansion during this time and his room was across the hall from Churchill’s. Hopkins’s biographer provided an insider’s view of the prime minister’s routines. **(SEE PG.32)**



G. Roosevelt and Churchill in the “map room” Roosevelt was very impressed with Churchill’s “mobile map room,” and set about to have one of his own. Historian Doris Kearns Goodwin described the map room and Eleanor Roosevelt’s reaction to seeing the two leaders working there. **(SEE PG.33)**

H. Roosevelt and Churchill: Preparing speeches. Doris Kearns Goodwin wrote about Churchill’s concerns over the speech he was to give before Congress on December 26, 1941, and described Harry Hopkins’s observations about the differences in speech preparation styles between Churchill and Roosevelt. **(SEE PG.34)**

I. Churchill on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. Winston Churchill offered his opinion about what he considered one of the most important outcomes of the Arcadia meetings, and discussed the benefits of the two nations sharing a common language. **(SEE PG.35)**

J. Churchill and Roosevelt: A light moment. President Roosevelt wanted the Soviets to agree to the inclusion of the phrase “religious freedom” in the Declaration by the United Nations. Churchill teased the President about his persuasiveness on this subject. **(SEE PG.36)**

PRIME MINISTER WINSTON CHURCHILL’S ADDRESS TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES *December 26, 1941*

Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives of the United States, I feel greatly honored that you should have thus invited me to enter the United States Senate Chamber and address the representatives of both branches of Congress. The fact that my American forebears have for so many generations played their part in the life of the United States, and that here I am, an Englishman, welcomed in your midst, makes this experience one of the most moving and thrilling in my life, which is already long and has not been entirely uneventful. I wish indeed that my mother, whose memory I cherish, across the vale of years, could have been here to see. By the way, I cannot help reflecting that if my father had been American and my mother British instead of the other way around, I might have got here on my own. In that case this would not have been the first time you would have heard my voice. In that case I should not have needed any invitation. But if I had it is hardly likely that it would have been unanimous. So perhaps things are better as they are.

I may confess, however, that I do not feel quite like a fish out of water in a legislative assembly where English is spoken. I am a child of the House of Commons. I was brought up in my father’s house to believe in democracy. “Trust the people.” That was his message. I used to see him cheered at meetings and in the streets by crowds of workmen way back in those aristocratic Victorian days when as Disraeli said “the world was for the few, and for the very few.”

Therefore I have been in full harmony all my life with the tides which have flowed on both sides of the Atlantic against privilege and monopoly and I have steered confidently towards the Gettysburg ideal of government of the people, by the people, for the people.

I owe my advancement entirely to the House of Commons, whose servant I am. In my country as in yours public men are proud to be the servants of the State and would be ashamed to be its masters. The House of Commons, if they thought the people wanted it, could, by a simple vote, remove me from my office. But I am not worrying about it at all.

As a matter of fact I am sure they will approve very highly of my journey here, for which I obtained the King’s permission, in order to meet the President of the United States and to



arrange with him for all that mapping out of our military plans and for all those intimate meetings of the high officers of the armed services in both countries which are indispensable for the successful prosecution of the war.

I should like to say first of all how much I have been impressed and encouraged by the breadth of view and sense of proportion which I have found in all quarters over here to which I have had access. Anyone who did not understand the size and solidarity of the foundations of the United States, might easily have expected to find an excited, disturbed, self-centered atmosphere, with all minds fixed upon the novel, startling, and painful episodes of sudden war as they hit America. After all, the United States have been attacked and set upon by three most powerfully armed dictator states, the greatest military power in Europe, the greatest military power in Asia-Japan, Germany and Italy have all declared and are making war upon you, and the quarrel is opened which can only end in their overthrow or yours.

But here in Washington in these memorable days I have found an Olympian fortitude which, far from being based upon complacency, is only the mask of an inflexible purpose and the proof of a sure, well-grounded confidence in the final outcome. We in Britain had the same feeling in our darkest days. We too were sure that in the end all would be well.

You do not, I am certain, underrate the severity of the ordeal to which you and we have still to be subjected. The forces ranged against us are enormous. They are bitter, they are ruthless. The wicked men and their factions, who have launched their peoples on the path of war and conquest, know that they will be called to terrible account if they cannot beat down by force of arms the peoples they have assailed. They will stop at nothing. They have a vast accumulation of war weapons of all kinds. They have highly trained and disciplined armies, navies and air services. They have plans and designs which have long been contrived and matured. They will stop at nothing that violence or treachery can suggest.

It is quite true that on our side our resources in manpower and materials are far greater than theirs. But only a portion of your resources are as yet mobilized and developed, and we both of us have much to learn in the cruel art of war. We have therefore without doubt a time of tribulation before us. In this same time, some ground will be lost which it will be hard and costly to regain. Many disappointments and unpleasant surprises await us. Many of them will afflict us before the full marshalling of our latent and total power can be accomplished.

For the best part of twenty years the youth of Britain and America have been taught that war was evil, which is true, and that it would never come again, which has been proved false. For the best part of twenty years, the youth of Germany, of Japan and Italy, have been taught that aggressive war is the noblest duty of the citizen and that it should be begun as soon as the necessary weapons and organization have been made. We have performed the duties and tasks of peace. They have plotted and planned for war. This naturally has placed us, in Britain, and now places you in the United States at a disadvantage which only time, courage and untiring exertion can correct.

We have indeed to be thankful that so much time has been granted to us. If Germany had tried to invade the British Isles after the French collapse in June, 1940, and if Japan had declared war on the British Empire and the United States at about the same date, no one can say what disasters and agonies might not have been our lot. But now, at the end of December, 1941, our transformation from easy-going peace to total war efficiency has made very great progress.

The broad flow of munitions in Great Britain has already begun. Immense strides have been made in the conversion of American industry to military purposes. And now that the United



States is at war, it is possible for orders to be given every day which in a year or eighteen months hence will produce results in war power beyond anything which has been seen or foreseen in the dictator states.

Provided that every effort is made, that nothing is kept back, that the whole manpower, brain power, virility, valor and civic virtue of the English-speaking world, with all its galaxy of loyal, friendly or associated communities and states-provided that is bent unremittingly to the simple but supreme task, I think it would be reasonable to hope that the end of 1942 will see us quite definitely in a better position than we are now. And that the year 1943 will enable us to assume the initiative upon an ample scale.

Some people may be startled or momentarily depressed when, like your President, I speak of a long and a hard war. Our peoples would rather know the truth, somber though it be. And after all, when we are doing the noblest work in the world, not only defending our hearths and homes, but the cause of freedom in every land, the question of whether deliverance comes in 1942 or 1943 or 1944, falls into its proper place in the grand proportions of human history. Sure I am that this day, now, we are the masters of our fate. That the task which has been set us is not above our strength. That its pangs and toils are not beyond our endurance. As long as we have faith in our cause, and an unconquerable willpower, salvation will not be denied us. In the words of the Psalmist: "He shall not be afraid of evil tidings. His heart is fixed, trusting in the Lord."

Not all the tidings will be evil. On the contrary, mighty strokes of war have already been dealt against the enemy-the glorious defense of their native soil by the Russian armies and people; wounds have been inflicted upon the Nazi tyranny and system which have bitten deep and will fester and inflame not only in the Nazi body but in the Nazi mind. The boastful Mussolini has crumpled already. He is now but a lackey and a serf, the merest utensil of his master's will. He has inflicted great suffering and wrong upon his own industrious people. He has been stripped of all his African empire. Abyssinia has been liberated. Our Armies of the East, which were so weak and ill-equipped at the moment of French desertion, now control all the regions from Teheran to Bengazi, and from Aleppo and Cyprus to the sources of the Nile.

For many months we devoted ourselves to preparing to take the offensive in Libya. The very considerable battle which has been proceeding there the last six weeks in the desert, has been most fiercely fought on both sides. Owing to the difficulties of supply upon the desert flank, we were never able to bring numerically equal forces to bear upon the enemy. Therefore we had to rely upon superiority in the numbers and qualities of tanks and aircraft, British and American. For the first time, aided by these-for the first time we have fought the enemy with equal weapons. For the first time we have made the Hun feel the sharp edge of those tools with which he has enslaved Europe. The armed forces of the enemy in Cyrenaica amounted to about 150,000 men, of whom a third were Germans. General Auchinleck set out to destroy totally that armed force, and I have every reason to believe that his aim will be fully accomplished. I am so glad to be able to place before you, members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, at this moment when you are entering the war, the proof that with proper weapons and proper organization, we are able to beat the life out of the savage Nazi.

What Hitlerism is suffering in Libya is only a sample and a foretaste of what we have got to give him and his accomplices wherever this war should lead us in every quarter of the Globe. There are good tidings also from blue water. The lifeline of supplies which joins our two nations across the ocean, without which all would fail, -that lifeline is flowing steadily and freely in spite of all that the enemy can do. It is a fact that the British Empire, which many



thought eighteen months ago was broken and ruined, is now incomparably stronger and is growing stronger with every month.

Lastly, if you will forgive me for saying it, to me the best tidings of all—the United States, united as never before, has drawn the sword for freedom and cast away the scabbard.

All these tremendous facts have led the subjugated peoples of Europe to lift up their heads again in hope. They have put aside forever the shameful temptation of resigning themselves to the conqueror's will. Hope has returned to the hearts of scores of millions of men and women, and with that hope there burns the flame of anger against the brutal, corrupt invader. And still more fiercely burn the fires of hatred and contempt for the filthy Quislings whom he has suborned.

In a dozen famous ancient states, now prostrate under the Nazi yoke, the masses of the people, all classes and creeds, await the hour of liberation when they too will once again be able to play their part and strike their blows like men. That hour will strike. And its solemn peal will proclaim that night is past and that the dawn has come.

The onslaught upon us, so long and so secretly planned by Japan, has presented both our countries with grievous problems for which we could not be fully prepared. If people ask me, as they have a right to ask me in England, "Why is it that you have not got an ample equipment of modern aircraft and army weapons of all kinds in Malaya and in the East Indies?"—I can only point to the victory General Auchinleck has gained in the Libyan campaign. Had we diverted and dispersed our gradually-growing resources between Libya and Malaya, we should have been found wanting in both theaters.

If the United States has been found at a disadvantage at various points in the Pacific Ocean, we know well that that is to no small extent because of the aid which you have been giving to us in munitions for the defense of the British Isles and for the Libyan campaign, and above all because of your help in the Battle of the Atlantic, upon which all depends and which has in consequence been successfully and prosperously maintained.

Of course, it would have been much better, I freely admit, if we had had enough resources of all kinds to be at full strength at all threatened points. But considering how slowly and reluctantly we brought ourselves to large-scale preparations, and how long these preparations take, we had no right to expect to be in such a fortunate position.

The choice of how to dispose of our hitherto limited resources had to be made by Britain in time of war, and by the United States in time of peace. And I believe that history will pronounce that upon the whole, and it is upon the whole that these matters must be judged, that the choice made was right. Now that we are together, now that we are linked in a righteous comradeship of arms, now that our two considerable nations, each in perfect unity, have joined all their life-energies in a common resolve—a new scene opens upon which a steady light will glow and brighten.

Many people have been astonished that Japan should in a single day have plunged into war against the United States and the British Empire. We all wonder why, if this dark design with its laborious and intricate preparations had been so long filling their secret minds, they did not choose our moment of weakness eighteen months ago. Viewed quite dispassionately, in spite of the losses we have suffered and the further punishment we shall have to take, it certainly appears an irrational act. It is of course only prudent to assume that they have made very careful calculations and think they see their way through. Nevertheless, there may be another explanation.



We know that for many years past the policy of Japan has been dominated by secret societies of subalterns and junior officers of the army and navy, who have enforced their will upon successive Japanese cabinets and parliaments by the assassination of any Japanese statesmen who opposed or who did not sufficiently further their aggressive policy. It may be that these societies, dazzled and dizzy with their own schemes of aggression and the prospect of early victories, have forced their country-against its better judgment-into war. They have certainly embarked upon a very considerable undertaking.

After the outrages they have committed upon us at Pearl Harbor, in the Pacific Islands, in the Philippines, in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, they must now know that the stakes for which they have decided to play are mortal. When we look at the resources of the United States and the British Empire compared to those of Japan; when we remember those of China, which have so long valiantly withstood invasion and tyranny-and when also we observe the Russian menace which hangs over Japan-it becomes still more difficult to reconcile Japanese action with prudence or even with sanity. What kind of a people do they think we are? Is it possible that they do not realize that we shall never cease to persevere against them until they have been taught a lesson which they and the world will never forget?

Members of the Senate, and members of the House of Representatives, I will turn for one moment more from the turmoil and convulsions of the present to the broader spaces of the future. Here we are together, facing a group of mighty foes who seek our ruin. Here we are together, defending all that to free men is dear. Twice in a single generation the catastrophe of world war has fallen upon us. Twice in our lifetime has the long arm of fate reached out across the oceans to bring the United States into the forefront of the battle.

If we had kept together after the last war, if we had taken common measures for our safety, this renewal of the curse need never have fallen upon us. Do we not owe it to ourselves, to our children, to tormented mankind, to make sure that these catastrophes do not engulf us for the third time?

It has been proved that pestilences may break out in the Old World which carry their destructive ravages into the New World, from which, once they are afoot, the New World can not escape. Duty and prudence alike command first that the germ-centers of hatred and revenge should be constantly and vigilantly served and treated in good time, and that an adequate organization should be set up to make sure that the pestilence can be controlled at its earliest beginnings, before it spreads and rages throughout the entire earth.

Five or six years ago it would have been easy, without shedding a drop of blood, for the United States and Great Britain to have insisted on the fulfilment of the disarmament clauses of the treaties which Germany signed after the Great War. And that also would have been the opportunity for assuring to the Germans those materials-those raw materials-which we declared in the Atlantic Charter should not be denied to any nation, victor or vanquished. The chance has passed, it is gone. Prodigious hammer-strokes have been needed to bring us together today.

If you will allow me to use other language, I will say that he must indeed have a blind soul who cannot see that some great purpose and design is being worked out here below of which we have the honor to be the faithful servants. It is not given to us to peer into the mysteries of the future. Still, I avow my hope and faith, sure and inviolate, that in the days to come the British and American peoples will, for their own safety and for the good of all, walk together in majesty, in justice and in peace.



A. Roosevelt and Churchill: A first meeting

On the last day of the Atlantic Conference, with all points of the Charter and the joint cable to Stalin straightened out, the President had the Prime Minister, Beaverbrook* and Hopkins to lunch, and this, from Hopkins' point of view, was the most satisfactory session of all. There was no business to be transacted. Both Roosevelt and Churchill were relaxed and amusing and amused. This was Hopkins' ambition as a "catalyst" or "marriage broker": to prove to Roosevelt that it was possible to be utterly at ease with Churchill and vice versa. Beaverbrook, whom Roosevelt had known of old, helped considerably in this process.

It would be an exaggeration to say that Roosevelt and Churchill became chums at this Conference or at any subsequent time. They established an easy intimacy, a joking informality and a moratorium on pomposity and cant – and also a degree of frankness in intercourse which, if not quite complete, was remarkably close to it. But neither of them ever forgot for one instant what he was and represented or what the other was and represented. Actually, their relationship was maintained to the end on the highest professional level. They were two men in the same line of business – politico-military leadership on a global scale – and theirs was a very limited field and the few who achieve it seldom have opportunities for getting together with fellow craftsmen in the same trade to compare notes and talk shop. They appraised each other through the practical eyes of professionals and from this appraisal resulted a degree of admiration and sympathetic understanding of each other's professional problems that lesser craftsmen could not have achieved. Thus, when Churchill was being particularly unyielding on some point during the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt could say to Hopkins, "We've got to remember that Winston has an election coming up." And, as the record proves, there were many occasions when the Prime Minister yielded on major points in deference to the domestic political problems which were forever besetting the President.

It is a matter of sacred tradition that, when an American statesman and a British statesman meet, the former will be plain, blunt, down to earth, and ingenious to a fault, while the latter will be sly, subtle, devious and eventually triumphant. In the cases of Roosevelt and Churchill, this formula became rather confused. If either of them could be called a student of Machiavelli, it was Roosevelt; if either was a bull in a china shop, it was Churchill. The Prime Minister quickly learned that he confronted in the President a man of infinite subtlety and obscurity – an artful dodger who could not readily be pinned down on specific points, nor hustled or wheedled into definite commitments against his judgment or his will or his instinct. And Roosevelt soon learned how pertinacious the Prime Minister could be in pursuance of a purpose. Churchill's admirers could call him "tenacious, indomitable," and his detractors could describe him as "obstinate, obdurate, dogged, mulish, and pig-headed." Probably both factions could agree on the word "stubborn," which may be flattering or derogatory. In any case, it was this quality which, at times, made him extremely tiresome to deal with and, at other times – and especially times of most awful adversity – made him great.

Roosevelt and Churchill certainly had the capacity to annoy each other, but the record of their tremendous association with one another contains a minimum of evidences of waspishness or indeed of anything less than the most amiable and most courteous consideration. For they had a large and wonderful capacity to stimulate and refresh each other. In one of the darkest hours of war, Roosevelt concluded a long serious cable to Churchill with the words, "It is fun to be in the same decade as you."

* Lord William Beaverbrook, British Minister of Supply

Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 363-364



B. Churchill: His faith in America's fighting spirit

No American will think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to have the United States at our side was to me the greatest joy. I could not foretell the course of events. I do not pretend to have measured accurately the martial might of Japan, but now at this very moment I knew the United States was in the war up to the neck and in to the death. So we had won after all. . . . We should not be wiped out. Our history would not come to an end. We might not even have to die as individuals. Hitler's fate was sealed. Mussolini's fate was sealed. As for the Japanese, they would be ground to powder. All the rest was merely the proper application of overwhelming force. The British Empire, the Soviet Union, and now the United States bound together with every scrap of their life and strength, were, according to my lights, twice or even thrice the force of their antagonists. No doubt it would take a long time. I expected terrible forfeits in the East; but all this would be merely a passing phase. United we could subdue everybody else in the world. Many disasters, immeasurable cost and tribulation lay ahead, but there was no more doubt about the end.

Silly people, and there were many, not only in enemy countries, might discount the force of the United States. Some said they were soft, others that they would never be united. They would fool around at a distance. They would never come to grips. They would never stand blood-letting. Their democracy and system of recurrent elections would paralyse their war effort. They would be just a vague blur on the horizon to friend or foe. Now we should see the weakness of this numerous but remote, wealthy, and talkative people. But I had studied the American Civil War, fought out to the last desperate inch. American blood flowed in my veins [Churchill's mother was American]. I thought of a remark which [British politician] Edward Grey had made to me more than thirty years before – that the United States is like “a gigantic boiler. Once the fire is lighted under it there is no limit to the power it can generate.” Being saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful.

The Grand Alliance, pp. 539-540



C. Churchill: Preparing to meet President Roosevelt

In order to prepare myself for meeting the President and for the American discussions and to make sure that I carried with me the two Chiefs of Staff, Pound and Portal, and General Dill, and that the facts could be checked in good time by General Hollis* and the Secretariat, I produced three papers on the future course of the war, as I conceived it should be steered. Each paper took four or five hours, spread over two or three days. As I had the whole picture in my mind it all came forth easily, but very slowly. In fact, it could have been written out two or three times in longhand in the same period. As each document was completed after being checked I sent it to my professional colleagues as an expression of my personal convictions. They were at the same time preparing papers of their own for the combined Staff conferences. I was glad to find that although my theme was more general and theirs more technical there was our usual harmony on principles and values. No differences were expressed which led to argument, and very few of the facts required correction. Thus, though nobody was committed in a precise or rigid fashion, we all arrived with a body of doctrine of a constructive character on which we were broadly united.

The first paper assembled the reasons why our main objective for the campaign of 1942 in the European theatre should be the occupation of the whole coastline of Africa and of the Levant from Dakar to the Turkish frontier by the British and American forces. The second dealt with the measures which should be taken to regain the command of the Pacific, and specified May 1942 as the month when this could be achieved. It dwelt particularly upon the need to multiply aircraft-carriers by improvising them in large numbers. The third declared as the ultimate objective the liberation of Europe by the landing of large Anglo-American armies wherever was thought best in the German-conquered territory, and fixed the year 1943 as the date for this supreme stroke.

I gave these three papers to the President before Christmas. I explained that while they were my own personal views, they did not supersede any formal communications between the Staff.

I couched them in the form of memoranda for the British Chiefs of Staff Committee. Moreover, I told him they were not written expressly for his eye, but that I thought it important that he should know what was in my mind and what I wanted to have done and so far as Great Britain was concerned, would try to bring to action. He read them immediately after receiving them, and the next day asked whether he might keep copies of them. To this I gladly assented. . . .

In October I could only tell him what our British ideas and plans were while we remained alone. We were now Allies, and must act in common and on a greater scale. I felt that he and I would find a large measure of agreement and that the ground had been well prepared. I was therefore in a hopeful mood.

* Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, British First Sea Lord; Air Marshall Sir Charles Portal, British Chief of Air Staff; Field Marshall Sir John Dill, British Chief of the Imperial General Staff; General Sir Leslie Hollis, Assistant Secretary of the British War Cabinet.

The Grand Alliance, pp. 573-574



D. Churchill describes his impressions of Roosevelt at the White House

It had been intended that we should steam up the Potomac and motor to the White House, but we were all impatient after nearly ten days at sea to end our journey. We therefore arranged to fly from Hampton Roads, and landed after dark on December 22 at the Washington airport. There was the President waiting in his car. I clasped his strong hand with comfort and pleasure. We soon reached the White House, which was to be in sense our home for the next three weeks. Here we were welcomed by Mrs. Roosevelt, who thought of everything to make our stay agreeable.

I must confess that my mind was so occupied with the whirl of the events and personal tasks I had to perform that my memory till refreshed had a preserved but vague impression of these days. The outstanding feature was of course my contacts with the President. We saw each other for several hours a day and lunched always together, with Harry Hopkins as a third. We talked of nothing but business, and reached a great measure of agreement on many points, both large and small. Dinner was a more social occasion, but equally intimate and friendly. The President punctiliously made the preliminary cocktails himself, and I wheeled him in his chair from the drawing-room to the lift as a mark of respect, and thinking also of Sir Walter Raleigh spreading his cloak before Queen Elizabeth. I formed a very strong affection, which grew with our years of comradeship, for this formidable politician who had imposed his will for nearly ten years upon the American scene, and whose heart seemed to respond to many of the impulses that stirred my own. As we both, by need or habit, were forced to do much of our work in bed, he visited me in my room whenever he felt inclined, and encouraged me to do the same to him. Hopkins was just across the passage from my bedroom, and next door to him, my traveling map room was soon installed. The President was much interested in this institution, which Captain Pim had perfected. He liked to come and study attentively the large maps of all the theatres of war which soon covered the walls, and on which the movement of fleets and armies was so accurately and swiftly recorded. It was not long before he established a map room of his own of the highest efficiency.

The Grand Alliance, pp. 587-588



E. Churchill: The White House chief butler's view

If I had thought the days of the early New Deal were busy, from then on I really had something to learn. For instance, on December 22 I thought that my daily detail was completed at 6:00 P.M. and was preparing to leave for home when my phone rang. I was told that an important guest was expected at about 7:00 P.M. The number in the party would be anywhere from 25 to 40 people, and the name of the guest was off the record.

Well, when the guest arrived one look told us that he was the Prime Minister of England, Winston Churchill.

This man Churchill was a dynamic personality. I felt it when he stepped into the room. His manner was typical of John Bull himself, with a jovial, ironic wit, a gruff, outspoken personality that could wax warm sometimes, yet I was sure that underneath it was cold, factual and determined. His entourage occupied the entire east wing of the White House.

His was a healthy appetite. On his breakfast tray I was instructed to have something hot, something cold, two kinds of fresh fruit, a tumbler of orange juice and a pot of frightfully weak tea. For "something hot" he had eggs, bacon or ham, and toast. For "something cold" he had two kinds of cold meats with English mustard and two kinds of fruit plus a tumbler of sherry. This was breakfast. At lunch he had Scotch and soda. For dinner always champagne, and after dinner, brandy. Then during the evening more Scotch and soda.

The Prime Minister would wear an air-raid suit around the house, attending most of the morning conference in this outfit. He would have conferences with his staff including Admiral Leahy, Admiral King and General Marshall. Later the two combined staffs would go into conference together which could last and last.

During this stay many people who knew that the Prime Minister was a house guest were disappointed, on being invited to the White House, not to meet the President and the Prime Minister. Except for official occasions, they did not eat in the dining room. By dining together with a few of their advisers much time was saved. Mr. Churchill was to be with us for quite a few days.

My Twenty-one Years in the White House, pp. 81-82



F. Churchill at the White House: An insider's view

Churchill arrived in Washington with his entourage on December 22 for the series of conferences which were known under the code name ARCADIA. He was installed in the big bedroom across the hall from Hopkins' room, and as the two of them walked back and forth to visit one another they had to pick their way through great piles of Christmas parcels. That upstairs hall in the White House underwent an extraordinary change. Ordinarily quiet and usually deserted, it was now the headquarters of the British Empire, and various dignitaries and staff officers and secretaries were continually hurrying through carrying the old, red leather dispatch cases which make British officials look really official. The White House staff were amazed and fascinated by these goings-on, and the British were even more amazed by the atmosphere of placidity and seeming detachment from events that surrounded the President and the incomprehensible fact that the total military staff on duty at the White House at some given moment might consist of one nervous Navy ensign. There was an even greater contrast, the other way around, between the size of Roosevelt's bodyguard and Churchill's; the British gave considerably less weight to the possibility of assassination.

The food in the White House was always better when Churchill was there and, of course, the wine flowed more freely. Since Churchill knew of Roosevelt's habits of going to bed early, he made a pretence of retiring himself at a fairly reasonable hour; but Roosevelt knew that his tireless guest and Hopkins would go on talking and he did not want to miss any of it so he stayed up much later than usual. The conversations that went on from early morning until late at night covered not only the entire world but a very large part of its history. Churchill was one of the few people to whom Roosevelt cared to listen, and vice versa.

Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 442



G. Roosevelt and Churchill in the Map Room

“Nobody enjoyed the war as much as Churchill did,” [American journalist] Martha Gellhorn wryly observed. “He loved the derring-do and rushing around. He got Roosevelt steamed up in his boy’s book of adventure.”

No sooner, for instance, had Roosevelt seen Churchill’s mobile map room than he wanted one of his own so that he, too, could visualize the progress of the war. Within days, a sophisticated map room was created on the ground floor of the White House in a low-ceilinged room that had previously been a coatroom for women. Located between the diplomatic reception room and [White House physician] Dr. McIntire’s office, it provided easy access for the president when he visited the doctor for his daily massage. “The walls were covered with fiberboard,” naval aide George Elsey recalled, “on which we pinned large-scale charts of the Atlantic and the Pacific. Updated two or three times a day, the charts displayed the constantly changing location of the enemy and Allied forces. Different shape pins were used for different types of ships, around-headed pin for destroyers, a square head for heavy cruisers. For the army we had a plastic cover with a grease pencil to change the battle lines as new dispatches came in.”

The information was derived from the War and Navy Departments; it was hand-delivered by messenger several times a day and then transferred to the big maps. Special pins revealed the location of the leaders of the Big Three. Churchill’s pin was shaped like a cigar, FDR’s like a cigarette holder, Stalin’s like a briar pipe. Since top-secret dispatches came in at all hours, the map room was manned around the clock by three shifts of officers taken from the navy, army, and air force. Beyond the map-room personnel, access was strictly limited to Roosevelt, Hopkins, Marshall, King, and Leahy.*

There was one occasion, however, when Eleanor, passing the map room on her way down the hall, happened to glance inside. There, in front of the brightly colored charts, she saw her husband and Churchill engaged in animated conversation, pointing at pins in various theaters of the war. “They looked like two little boys playing soldier,” Eleanor observed. “They seemed to be having a wonderful time, too wonderful in fact. It made me a little sad somehow.”

* General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations; U.S. Admiral William Leahy, member of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

No Ordinary Time, pp. 310-311



H. Roosevelt and Churchill: Preparing speeches

The prime minister's methods of preparing a speech fascinated [Harry] Hopkins. Trained by years of vigorous debate in the House of Commons, Churchill liked to think on his feet, dictating his speeches as he paced up and down the room, imagining that a large crowd had already assembled. At various times, he would refer to notes he had made in the preceding days, but most of the phrasing and imagery emerged from his head and his heart, a product, [British philosopher] Isaiah Berlin once observed, of his capacity "for sustained introspective brooding, great depth and constancy of feeling – in particular, feeling for and fidelity to the great tradition for which he assumes a personal responsibility." This peculiar pride in the British people had assumed a major role in Churchill's speeches in the dark days of 1940.

Hopkins told Moran [Churchill's personal physician], during a long conversation in his bedroom one evening, that it was interesting to hear two great orators with such different methods. When Roosevelt prepared a speech, Hopkins observed, he "wastes little time in turning phrases; he tries to say what is in his mind in the shortest and simplest words. All the time he gives to that particular speech is spent in working out what each individual in his audience will think about it; he always thinks of individuals, never of a crowd."

In contrast, though Churchill had learned by long experience the feel of an audience as a whole, he knew little about their individual lives, their experiences, their aspirations. Churchill, Isaiah Berlin observed, in contrast to Roosevelt, "does not reflect a social or moral world in an intense and concentrated fashion; rather, he creates one of such power and coherence that it becomes reality and alters the external world by being imposed upon it with irresistible force."

No Ordinary Time, pp. 308-309



I. Churchill on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee

It may well be thought by future historians that the most valuable and lasting result of our first Washington conference – “Arcadia”, as it was code-named – was the setting up of the now famous “Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee”. Its headquarters were in Washington, but since the British Chiefs of Staff had to live close to their own Government they were represented by high officers stationed there permanently. These representatives were in daily, indeed hourly, touch with London, and were thus able to state and explain views of the British Chiefs of Staff to their U.S. colleagues on any and every war problem at any time of the day or night. . . .

The enjoyment of a common language was of course a supreme advantage in all British and American discussions. The delays and often partial misunderstandings which occur when interpreters are used were avoided. There were however differences of expression, which in the early days led to an amusing incident. The British Staff prepared a paper which they wished to raise as a matter of urgency, and informed their American colleagues that they wish to “table it”. To the American Staff “tabling” a paper meant putting it away in a drawer and forgetting it. A long and even acrimonious argument ensued before both parties realised that they were agreed on the merits and wanted the same thing.

The Grand Alliance, pp. 608-609



J. Churchill to Roosevelt: A light moment

On my return to the White House all was ready for the signature of the United Nations Pact. Many telegrams had passed between Washington, London, and Moscow, but now all was settled. The President had exerted his most fervent efforts to persuade Litvinov, the Soviet Ambassador, newly restored to favour by the turn of events, to accept the phrase "religious freedom". He was invited to luncheon with us in the President's room on purpose. After his hard experiences in his own country he had to be careful. Later on the President had a long talk with him alone about his soul and the dangers of hell-fire. The accounts which Mr. Roosevelt gave us on several occasions of what he said to the Russian were impressive. Indeed, on one occasion I promised Mr. Roosevelt to recommend him for the position of Archbishop of Canterbury if he should lose the next Presidential election. I did not however make any official recommendation to the Cabinet or the Crown upon this point, and as he won the election in 1944 it did not arise. Litvinov reported the issue about "religious freedom" in evident fear and trembling to Stalin, who accepted it as a matter of course. The War Cabinet also got their point in it about "social security", with which, as the author of the first Unemployment Insurance Act, I cordially concurred. After a spate of telegrams had flowed about the world for a week agreement was reached throughout the Grand Alliance.

The Grand Alliance, pp. 604-605

