

Achieving Peace: Diplomacy and the Camp David Accords

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Process Paper

To begin choosing my topic, I decided to focus on my interest in Israel and the Middle East. A seminar I attended last August entitled “Weizmann's ‘Speech to the 20th Zionist Congress,’” in which he proposed the establishment of a Jewish homeland in 1938, had sparked my interest in the region. I decided to research further to find a topic relating to the annual NHD theme. I found no shortage of debates or diplomacy, but I also had my own specific criteria in mind. Mainly, I wanted to choose a topic that had current relevance and that held lessons for the present. The Camp David Accords not only thoroughly fit the theme description, diplomacy being woven throughout the peace-making process, but also are very relevant to the resolution of conflict in the Middle East today.

I began my research by consulting secondary sources, consisting primarily of books and articles. Books were especially helpful and went into far greater detail than I could include in my paper. Recent articles discussing the legacy of Camp David were useful in forming my own arguments and counterarguments. However, the bulk of my research was in primary sources. Jimmy Carter’s detailed accounts of the Camp David accords were instrumental in piecing together the story and painting a picture of each leader involved. In addition, I used databases provided by my local library to comb through newspaper articles, speeches, and interviews. These primary sources helped me come to my own conclusions about the diplomatic process.

I created my project over the course of several months, spending the majority of the time in the research stage. Afterward, I developed my thesis based on my findings, created an outline, and drafted my paper. Then came the most difficult aspect of writing this paper; the word limit. My first draft was over a thousand words too long, and I still had more that I wanted to say. There was so much that I would have liked to include, for example the role of the Palestinians in

the negotiations. Unfortunately, entire books have been written on this subject alone. I had to limit my paper to a singular focus, the successful diplomacy between Egypt and Israel as mediated by the United States.

I argued that the leadership of Carter, Sadat, and Begin at Camp David were the decisive factors, and the biggest reason for its success. That such leadership was the key factor above other elements of the dispute is debatable. However, I believe that their qualities as leaders were critical, and that these characteristics are relevant to future efforts at diplomacy in the Middle East.

The Camp David accords are a significant moment in history because they exemplify diplomatic success in a region that seems far away from peaceful resolution of conflict. Following a series of wars between the two nations, the Accords brought about normal diplomatic relations and an end to violence and destruction. Over forty years later, the two countries are still at peace.

Achieving Peace: Diplomacy and the Camp David Accords

“Peace is not a game of calling for peace to defend certain whims or hide certain ambitions. Peace is a giant struggle against all and every ambition and whim.” - Anwar Sadat¹

Nowhere is diplomacy as critical to the resolution of conflict as in the case of Israel and its neighbors. Diplomacy has proven capable of achieving peace with more success than any of the countless wars fought in the region. The foremost example is the Camp David accords negotiated by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and American President Jimmy Carter.

Camp David was successful because of these leaders' determined diplomacy. They developed effective personal relationships, took political risks, compromised on their own interests, and above all truly desired peace. Though they failed to implement a peace agreement for the entire region, each leader should serve as a model for future leaders who similarly endeavor to bring a complete peace to the Middle East.

Beginning with the Israeli War of Independence in 1948, Egypt and Israel clashed frequently.² In 1967, countering Egyptian threats of war, Israel conducted a preemptive military strike and decimated the Egyptian air force. When Israel emerged victorious after only six days, it had gained control of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and Gaza.³

The United Nations Security Council then passed Resolution 242, calling for peace and “emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,” essentially petitioning

¹ Anwar Sadat, "Address by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to the Knesset," speech presented in Jerusalem, Israel, November 20, 1977, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/address-by-egyptian-president-anwar-sadat-to-the-knesset>.

² Lawrence Wright, *Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 1.

³ Jeremy Bowen, "1967 War: Six Days That Changed the Middle East," BBC News, last modified June 5, 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461>.

Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders (see Appendix).⁴ The land Israel captured from Egypt was to become a significant dispute between them during the Camp David peace talks, along with the question of Palestinian-Arabs displaced by the Israeli Independence War.⁵

Three Diplomats: Carter, Sadat, and Begin

President Jimmy Carter's involvement with Camp David was critical to its success. Peace in the Middle East was the focus of Carter's foreign policy agenda.⁶ Specifically, his ability to form relationships with Sadat and Begin during his presidency was enormously consequential. However, his relationship with Israel began much earlier. After a visit to Israel in 1973, Carter says that he thereafter dedicated himself to preserving Israel's security and prosperity.⁷ Even at that early stage, he called for "major concessions by Arab states," such as diplomatic recognition,⁸ and he declared his staunch support for Israel's permanent existence and disavowed Arab embargos toward Israel.⁹ As Carter took on the role of mediator, forming friendships with world leaders was a principal objective. Carter met with Sadat, Begin, and Begin's predecessor, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.¹⁰

His meetings with Begin and Sadat highlighted Carter's effectiveness at developing personal relationships, which played a major role in the success of his diplomatic endeavors.

⁴ United States Security Council (UNSC) Res 242 (22 November 1967) UN doc S/RES/242.

⁵ Jimmy Carter, *We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land: A Plan That Will Work* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 10.

⁶ Carter, *We Can Have*, 17.

⁷ Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, University of Arkansas pbk. ed. (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 1995), 281.

⁸ Charles Mohr, "Carter Gets an Ovation after Assuring Jews in Jersey on His Religious Views," *The New York Times* (New York, NY), June 7, 1976, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/122933089/4D90893F3AD941BAPQ/1>.

⁹ Jimmy Carter, "Address to a Conference of the Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations in Boston, Massachusetts," address, September 30, 1976, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-conference-the-presidents-major-jewish-organizations-boston-massachusetts>.

¹⁰ Carter, 25.

Sadat would spark a deep relationship with Carter; “there was an easy and natural friendship between [them] from the first moment.”¹¹ Carter describes this sentiment, stating of their first meeting that Sadat “brought a new and shining light to the issue of peace.”¹² They were personal friends, outside of the public's view, and had each other's trust.¹³ Several times throughout the negotiation process, their friendship would allow Carter to talk Sadat out of impulsive decisions that would jeopardize peace talks. In one instance, Sadat told Carter of his intentions to discontinue peace talks with Israel after some inflammatory remarks by Begin. Carter managed to convince Sadat that this would demonstrate a lack of cooperation on his part, and at Carter's request he decided to wait.¹⁴ On another occasion, Sadat almost left Camp David, but Carter stopped him by citing their friendship. Carter wrote, “I told him it would damage one of my most precious possessions - his friendship and our mutual trust.”¹⁵ Carter's ability to form friendships was crucial to diplomacy as it allowed him to resolve these precarious situations.

In contrast, Carter was unpleasantly surprised when meeting with Prime Minister Rabin, finding him inflexible and stubborn.¹⁶ When a political scandal soon caused Rabin to withdraw his candidacy for reelection, Carter reflected that “this decision was to revolutionize the domestic political scene in Israel.”¹⁷ The election of the right-wing Menachem Begin, a former militant and pertinacious negotiator, was the source of this revolution.

Carter, along with the rest of the world, was shocked by Begin's victory. Not only were his political views seen as extreme, but also he had led the underground militant group Irgun

¹¹ Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 291.

¹² Carter, *We Can Have*, 29

¹³ Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 291.

¹⁴ Carter, 341

¹⁵ Carter, 401

¹⁶ Carter, 287.

¹⁷ Carter, 292.

Zvai Leumi, known for using terrorist tactics during the Israeli struggle for Independence in the 1940s.¹⁸

From his first days in office, Begin was a controversial figure. He believed Israel would be sacrificing security by returning territory to Egypt.¹⁹ He preferred to use the term “liberated” in place of “occupied” to refer to territories gained in the Six Day War.²⁰ He held that U.N Resolution 242 was invalid due to the war being fought in self-defense.²¹ He made contradictory, confusing statements about what he was willing to concede, deeply frustrating Carter.²² If Rabin was inflexible and stubborn, Begin was downright mulish. And yet, Carter formed a friendship with Begin, which, as with Sadat, was crucial to Camp David’s success.

Despite his frustration with Begin, Carter had much faith in him as a leader.²³ He did his best to understand Begin, from his motivations and religious views to his health conditions. Carter’s understanding of the leader aided diplomacy, even using his own annotated Bible in his discussions with him at Camp David.²⁴ Carter’s diplomatic achievement was forming a sincere relationship with his fellow leaders outside of public view. Having each side’s trust, Carter could effectively play the role of mediator.

In addition to Carter’s mediation, Sadat’s political risk-taking played a crucial role in initiating diplomacy preceding Camp David. He made bold gestures and endured political backlash throughout the peace-making process in order to effectuate diplomatic relations.²⁵ An early example of his shrewd political decision-making was the 1973 (Yom Kippur) war. He

¹⁸ Wright, *Thirteen Days*, 8.

¹⁹ Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 371

²⁰ "Occupied, Not Liberated," *The Sun*, August 25, 1977, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/541102699>.

²¹ Carter, *Keeping Faith* 334.

²² Carter, 415.

²³ Carter, 297.

²⁴ Carter, 326-329

²⁵ Thomas Lippman, "Sadat Risking Wrath of Other Arab Leaders," *The Washington Post*, November 16, 1977, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/146684303?accountid=46320>.

partnered with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, ostensibly to regain their lost territory. Certainly, al-Assad's primary motivation was to take back the Golan Heights.²⁶ Sadat's decision to take military action, however, was in hopes of initiating negotiations with Israel. In his autobiography, published a year before the Camp David accords, he explains that "it was impossible . . . for the United States (or indeed, any other power) to make a move if we ourselves didn't break the deadlock."²⁷ Sadat wanted to show the world that Israel was not as invulnerable as they had seemed in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, and regain negotiating strength in the process.²⁸ Overall, his ultimate goal was to move past stalemate and into a diplomatic arena where Egypt was powerful enough to support its interests. Though failing to regain the territory held by Israel, this bold move succeeded in strengthening Egypt's position.

Sadat was inclined to take these sorts of bold actions, political risk-taking being an aspect of his personal diplomatic style.²⁹ The most notable example of this propensity was Sadat's famous announcement to the Egyptian people expressing his willingness to visit the Israeli Knesset in 1977, while the two countries were in an official state of war.³⁰ It was a momentous occasion, and, aided by the United States, Begin officially invited Sadat to Israel.³¹

In visiting Israel, Sadat took on immense political risk and faced the wrath of the Arab world. Some Arabs saw his move as a betrayal, giving Israel recognition for nothing in return.³²

²⁶ Al Jazeera Media Network, "The October Arab-Israeli War of 1973: What Happened?," Al Jazeera, last modified October 8, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/10/8/the-october-arab-israeli-war-of-1973-what-happened>

²⁷ Anwar El-Sadat, *In Search of Identity* (New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), 238.

²⁸ James W. Bean and Craig S. Girard, "Anwar Al-Sadat's Grand Strategy in the Yom Kippur War," Defense Technical Information Center, last modified 2001, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA442407.pdf>.

²⁹ Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 289

³⁰ Anwar Sadat, "President Sadat's Address to the Egyptian Parliament," speech presented in Cairo, Egypt, November 9, 1977, in *Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence*, ed. Harry Hurwitz and Yisrael Medad (Jerusalem, Israel: Gefen Publishing House, 2011), 4-6.

³¹ Hurwitz and Medad, *Peace in the Making*, 14.

³² "Arabs React Violently to Sadat's Speech," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), November 1977, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/387132418/27C1920A10B34AF3PQ/15?parentSessionId=1y%2Bp69DK6cC7dDgPhY%2BmYQkSj30JF5F0wRuBY1857tg%3D>.

Radicals called for his overthrow and assassination.³³ Sadat's own foreign minister resigned in protest while nations such as Syria and Iraq condemned the visit.³⁴ Despite the danger, Sadat became the first Arab leader to officially visit Israel, and gave a transformational speech to the Knesset. In it, he called for Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories and for the full realization of Palestinian rights. He was firm that he would not accept a partial peace agreement that excluded the Palestinians, exclaiming that "no one can build his happiness at the expense of the misery of others."³⁵ However, his speech also marked a turning point for Egyptian-Israeli relations, and catalyzed Camp David. He proclaimed, "You want to live with us in this part of the world. In all sincerity, I tell you, we welcome you among us."³⁶ His words, substantiated by the daring move to visit Israel and meet with Begin, initiated negotiations at Camp David.

At Camp David

The ultimate success of Camp David was the development of a compromise between Sadat and Begin, which resulted from their profound desire for peace that allowed them to overcome their differences. However, the process was long and difficult, each side wanting to promote their own interests as much as possible.

Carter, as the mediator, elucidated Sadat's two major demands: the Israelis had to leave occupied territory and allow the Palestinian people a right to self-determination.³⁷ Begin was

³³ "Egypt Seeks to Counter Criticisms by Arabs," *Evening Star*, November 22, 1977, https://infoweb-newsbank-com.dclibrary.idm.oclc.org/apps/news/document-view?p=WORLDNEWS&t=&sort=YMD_date%3AD&fld-base-0=alltext&maxresults=20&val-base-0=sadat%20overthrow%20&fld-nav-0=YMD_date&val-nav-0=1976%20-%201977&docref=image/v2%3A13D5DA85AE05A305%40EANX-NB-14E81BDE6FCC84D1%402443470-14E5E973525BDC67%408-14E5E973525BDC67%40#copy.

³⁴ Bernard Gwertzman, "Sadat Goes to Israel Tomorrow; His Foreign Minister Resigns; Syria and Iraq Condemn Visit," *New York Times* (New York, NY), November 18, 1977, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/123405118/CF366AC32BDC47B9PQ/10>.

³⁵ Sadat, "Address by Egyptian," speech.

³⁶ Sadat, "Address by Egyptian," speech.

³⁷ Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 336

originally opposed to both of these demands. In his talks with Carter, he emphasized the importance of security, concerned that fulfilling Sadat's requests would undermine it. Begin claimed that "the Israeli settlements on Egyptian soil were a necessary buffer between Gaza and Egypt."³⁸

On the third day of discussions, Carter, Sadat, and Begin met to discuss a preliminary proposal, which turned into a heated debate over land. Begin's positions were unmovable, and, believing that a stalemate had been reached already, Sadat expressed that he "saw no reason for discussions to continue." Carter, proving the importance of his friendship with Sadat, reminded him of the consequences of failure. He urged the leaders not to break off their talks, and they reluctantly agreed.³⁹

Carter soon learned that the two men were incompatible, and he spent the rest of the thirteen days at Camp David shuttling between each leader, bringing proposals back and forth.⁴⁰ For much of the process, Begin held his position that he would not dismantle any Israeli settlements, believing the land to have been acquired in a war of self-defense.⁴¹

Despite his continuous efforts, by day ten of negotiations, Carter was deeply discouraged. He writes that the issue of the settlements "would be the end of [their] effort for peace."⁴² Begin was proving himself to be as stubborn as Carter had feared. Begin's stances appeared land-hungry and unwavering. In Sadat's words, Begin seemed not to be "ready for peace."⁴³ Sadat was flexible on most details, yet Begin would not budge.

Despite his frustrations, Carter maintained his faith in Begin. This was not just Carter's optimistic nature and inclination to see good in people; Begin, for all of his provocative

³⁸ Carter, 341

³⁹ Carter, 358-359

⁴⁰ Carter, 364

⁴¹ Carter, 394

⁴² Carter, 399

⁴³ Carter, 368

statements, had made clear that he was willing to participate in peace talks from his very first speech to the Israeli Knesset. Announcing that his top priority was the prevention of another war, he exclaimed, “let us put an end to the blood shedding that is abhorrent to us, and sit down at the negotiating table.”⁴⁴ His calls for peace were not merely pro forma, but sincerely declared his willingness to cooperate.⁴⁵ His actions and statements, privately and publicly, demonstrated his desire for peace. This nagging feeling would undermine his stubbornness at Camp David and cause him to agree to a last minute deal.

Carter highlights this in an emotional anecdote during the last few days of negotiations. Talks had fallen apart, and the diplomats were preparing to leave, but having promised to sign pictures for Begin’s grandchildren, Carter visited Begin’s cabin a final time to deliver the photographs. In this touching story, Begin privately wept with Carter over pictures of his grandchildren and his concern for their future in a region stricken by almost constant conflict.⁴⁶ Tears rolling down his cheeks, he asked, “why don’t we try one more time?”⁴⁷ Though Begin had sworn to never dismantle a single settlement, he agreed to submit to the Knesset within two weeks the question: “If agreement is reached on all other Sinai issues, should settlers be

⁴⁴ Menachem Begin, "Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin upon the Presentation of His Government," speech presented in Jerusalem, Israel, June 20, 1977, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Pages/Documents_Foreign_Policy_Israel.aspx.

⁴⁵ Menachem Begin, "Broadcast by Prime Minister Begin to the Egyptian People," speech, November 11, 1977, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook3/pages/65%20broadcast%20by%20prime%20minister%20begin%20to%20the%20egypti.aspx>.

⁴⁶ Jimmy Carter, "Interview with the President Question-and-Answer Session with Bill Moyers of the Public Broadcasting Service.," The American Presidency Project, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-the-president-question-and-answer-session-with-bill-moyers-the-public>.

⁴⁷ Jimmy Carter, "Remarks by President Jimmy Carter," speech presented at University of Maryland, College Park, MD, October 25, 1998, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, <https://sadat.umd.edu/events/remarks-president-jimmy-carter>.

withdrawn?"⁴⁸ This concession was enough for Sadat, Begin would not have to make the decision himself, and the Knesset voted its approval overwhelmingly.⁴⁹

Legacy: Successes, Failures, Consequences

Diplomacy at Camp David led to a lasting peace between Egypt and Israel. The accords were successful in normalizing diplomatic relations between the nations and bringing an end to a cycle of violence.⁵⁰ Sadat's so-called "concessionary negotiating"⁵¹ strategy brought peace to Egypt and Israel, and thus was an overall success. However, its legacy also includes some failures in relation to the Palestinian-Arabs. From the perspective of some Palestinians, Sadat's efforts were "treacherous" and an "usurpation" of Palestine.⁵² Certainly, the Camp David accords did not succeed in bringing peace to Palestinian-Israeli relations. Why?

Factors other than leadership contributed to the success of the accords, specifically the clarity of the disputes at hand. Because of this, some argue that the Camp David accords have limited applicability to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is partially true; the conflict between Egypt and Israel could be simplified to a border dispute, and the success of the accords could be attributed to a straight-forward resolution: Israel and Egypt agreed to respect each others' borders in exchange for peace. However, with Israel and Palestine, "both parties' sense of

⁴⁸ Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 405

⁴⁹ "Israeli Cabinet Votes for Dismantling of Sinai Settlements in Return for Treaty," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, Ontario), September 25, 1978, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/387034284/DD0C8482D7B24DA8PQ/21>.

⁵⁰ National Archives and Records Administration, "Camp David Accords: The Framework for Peace in the Middle East," The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/research/framework_for_peace_in_the_middle_east.

⁵¹ Seth Anziska, *Preventing Palestine: A Political History from Camp David to Oslo* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 116.

⁵² Hosni Radwan, *Camp David Treacherous Accords*, 1979, image, accessed February 13, 2022, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/camp-david-treacherous-accords>.

nationhood is tied to the same land and the claims of both parties are much more zero-sum," thus the conflict is much more difficult to solve.⁵³

Nevertheless, Camp David still provides a model for leadership and diplomacy that is very much applicable to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, regardless of its more complex nature. Carter, Sadat, and Begin each teach lessons in diplomatic strategy, and each represent important elements of successful diplomacy. Carter, the mediator, brought out the best in Sadat and Begin. He was able to recognize Begin's goodwill which could have been overlooked in favor of his radical right-wing persona. He also formed a relationship with each leader, and earned their trust. His friendships and respect for the other leaders was of paramount importance to stopping Sadat and Begin from upending the discussions in moments of discouragement. Carter was able to find an agreement between two people who could not stand to be in the same room as each other.

Mediation is a key tool of diplomacy, and would be constructive to a Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement. However, mediation alone is not enough to reconcile hostile leaders. Sadat was willing to compromise, and that fact was crucial to Camp David's success. Even more important was his willingness to take political risks to prove goodwill. His visit to the Knesset was foundational to the Camp David accords, and they would not have succeeded otherwise.⁵⁴

Finally, Begin's role in the negotiations was more subtle, but in fact he symbolizes the most crucial determiner of success in any future negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis: each leader must truly desire peace. At times, Begin was disagreeable and inflexible. In certain



⁵³ Robert Barron, Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, and Michael Yaffe, "Middle East Peace: What Can We Learn from Camp David 40 Years Later?," United States Institute of Peace, last modified March 25, 2019, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/03/middle-east-peace-what-can-we-learn-camp-david-40-years-later>.

⁵⁴ Michael Yaffe, Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, and Robert Barron, "Half Right and Still Waiting," *The Cairo Review of Global Affairs*, no. 32 (Winter 2019): accessed November 20, 2021, <https://www.thecaireview.com/essays/half-right-and-still-waiting/>; Alex Winston, "When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat Addressed the Knesset," *The Jerusalem Post*, last modified November 20, 2020, <https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/egypt-president-anwar-sadat-addresses-the-knesset-november-20-1977-649723>.

situations, he may have seemed hungry for land. However, in the end he would not lose the opportunity to end war with Egypt because he valued peace. Camp David was successful because Carter, Sadat, and Begin each recognized their mutual interest in an end to war. This must be the case for future leaders in the Middle East to find success.

Appendix

Maps of Israeli borders before and after the 1967 (Six-Day) War demonstrating territory acquisition.



Annotated Bibliography

Primary Sources

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<https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook3/pages/65%20broadcast%20by%20prime%20minister%20begin%20to%20the%20egypti.aspx>.
 This broadcast by Prime Minister Begin illustrates his goodwill toward the Egyptian people, similarly to Sadat's speech to the Knesset. It helped me understand Begin's motivations at the Camp David accords which were sometimes unclear.
- Carter, Jimmy. "Address to a Conference of the Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations in Boston, Massachusetts." Address, September 30, 1976.
<https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-conference-the-presidents-major-jewish-organizations-boston-massachusetts>.
 This is a campaign speech given by Jimmy Carter to a conference of Jewish Americans. He expressed his support for Israel and gained Jewish support for his presidential campaign, demonstrating his early commitment to issues in the Middle East.
- Evening Star*. "Egypt Seeks to Counter Criticisms by Arabs." November 22, 1977.
https://infoweb-newsbank-com.dclibrary.idm.oclc.org/apps/news/document-view?p=WORDLNEWS&t=&sort=YMD_date%3AD&fld-base-0=alltext&maxresults=20&val-base-0=sadat%20overthrow%20&fld-nav-0=YMD_date&val-nav-0=1976%20-%201977&docref=image/v2%3A13D5DA85AE05A305%40EANX-NB-14E81BDE6FCC84D1%402443470-14E5E973525BDC67%408-14E5E973525BDC67%40#copy.
 This newspaper article helps establish the risks that Sadat undertook in going to the Israeli Knesset. It describes calls for overthrow and assassination that occurred after his speech.
- El-Sadat, Anwar. *In Search of Identity*. New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977.
 This book is Anwar el-Sadat's autobiography, written a year before the Camp David accords. Sadat describes his role in the 1973 war, and even provides insight into how his motivations were linked to achieving peace with Israel early on. He even delves into what he considers non-negotiable in any peace treaty drawn up with Israel, including the return of land and Palestinian rights.
- The Globe and Mail (Toronto, Ontario). "Israeli Cabinet Votes for Dismantling of Sinai Settlements in Return for Treaty." September 25, 1978.
<https://www.proquest.com/docview/387034284/DD0C8482D7B24DA8PQ/21>.
 This source shows me how one of the disputes at Camp David was resolved. Begin did not want to dismantle settlements and go back on his word that he would not do so, but he was able to get around this by agreeing to have the Knesset make the decision.

The Globe and Mail (Toronto). "Arabs React Violently to Sadat's Speech." November 1977.
<https://www.proquest.com/docview/387132418/27C1920A10B34AF3PQ/15?parentSessionId=1y%2Bp69DK6cC7dDgPhY%2BmYQkSj30JF5F0wRuBY1857tg%3D>.

This article describes the reaction to Sadat's visit to the Knesset in the Arab world, in particular how some saw his move as a betrayal. This is useful in understanding a different perspective to Sadat's groundbreaking move.

Gwertzman, Bernard. "Sadat Goes to Israel Tomorrow; His Foreign Minister Resigns; Syria and Iraq Condemn Visit." *New York Times* (New York, NY), November 18, 1977.

<https://www.proquest.com/docview/123405118/CF366AC32BDC47B9PQ/10>.

This newspaper article covers the reaction to Sadat's plan to visit Israel. It highlights the resignation of Sadat's own foreign minister, which helps to illustrate the controversial and bold nature of his decision to visit Israel.

"Interview with the President Question-and-Answer Session with Bill Moyers of the Public Broadcasting Service." The American Presidency Project.

<https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-the-president-question-and-answer-session-with-bill-moyers-the-public>.

In this interview, Jimmy Carter recounts an anecdote from his time at Camp David. He relates this moment, where he bonds with Begin over the future of their children, with Camp David's eventual success. This helps me understand how their friendship and shared values contributed to Camp David.

Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. University of Arkansas pbk. ed. Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 1995.

This title is a memoir written by President Carter that goes into great detail about Camp David, including the events preceding it and succeeding it. He discusses his own thoughts and emotions at the time and how he perceived the peace making process, which helps me understand his perspective throughout the process.

Lippman, Thomas. "Sadat Risking Wrath of Other Arab Leaders." *The Washington Post*, November 16, 1977. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/146684303?accountid=46320>.

This article provides insight into how the Arab world reacted to Sadat's decision to go to Israel. It also highlights Sadat's bold political risk-taking and the potentially disastrous political consequences that Sadat took on.

Mohr, Charles. "Carter Gets an Ovation after Assuring Jews in Jersey on His Religious Views."

The New York Times (New York, NY), June 7, 1976, 22.

<https://www.proquest.com/docview/122933089/4D90893F3AD941BAPQ/1>.

On the campaign trail, Carter garnered support from the American Jewish community by expressing his commitment to Israel. In his speech to an Orthodox Jewish synagogue, he received a standing ovation, demonstrating his early relationship with foreign policy relating to Israel.

National Archives and Records Administration. "Camp David Accords: The Framework for Peace in the Middle East." The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/research/framework_for_peace_in_the_middle_east. The Camp David accords themselves outline two separate processes, one with specific instructions for Egyptian-Israeli relations, and the other with broader concepts regarding Palestine. The information in this source is often discussed in secondary sources, so it is useful to gain a thorough understanding of its contents.

"President Sadat's Address to the Egyptian Parliament." Speech presented in Cairo, Egypt, November 9, 1977. In *Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence*, edited by Harry Hurwitz and Yisrael Medad, 4-6. Jerusalem, Israel: Gefen Publishing House, 2011.
This source is an address by President Sadat in which he announces that he would go to the Knesset itself in order to achieve peace. This speech is momentous and helps catalyze the Camp David accords, so it is useful to discuss in my paper.

Radwan, Hosni. *Camp David Treacherous Accords*. 1979. Image. Accessed February 13, 2022. <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/camp-david-treacherous-accords>.
This image displays a different perspective to the Camp David accords and demonstrates how some saw it as a failure. This helps me develop a paper that considers the different historical perspectives of different groups involved.

"Remarks by President Jimmy Carter." Speech presented at University of Maryland, College Park, MD, October 25, 1998. Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development. <https://sadat.umd.edu/events/remarks-president-jimmy-carter>.
This speech by Jimmy Carter helps me understand his reflections of Camp David and what he believed to be some of the most important takeaways. This also provided details about major moments at Camp David.

Sadat, Anwar. "Address by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to the Knesset." Speech presented in Jerusalem, Israel, November 20, 1977. <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/address-by-egyptian-president-anwar-sadat-to-the-knesset>.
This is Anwar Sadat's address to the Knesset, one of the catalysts to the Camp David Accords. This gesture was a very important symbol of diplomacy and of his openness to negotiation for peace.

"Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin upon the Presentation of His Government, 20 June 1977." Speech presented in Jerusalem, Israel, June 20, 1977. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last modified June 20, 1977. Accessed January 17, 2022. https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Pages/Documents_Foreign_Policy_Israel.aspx.
This statement by Begin shines a light on his motivations at the Camp David accords and demonstrates his commitment to a diplomatic resolution of the conflict between Egypt and Israel. It develops the idea that Begin aimed to achieve peace, and did so from the beginning of his tenure as Prime Minister.

The Sun. "Occupied, Not Liberated." August 25, 1977.

<https://www.proquest.com/docview/541102699>.

Begin's word choice in describing obtained territory is important to understanding his perspective. He described the territories won during the Six-Day War as "liberated," which contrasts with how others chose to designate it, including Carter and the U.N.

United States Security Council (UNSC) Res 242 (22 November 1967) UN doc S/RES/242

UN Resolution 242 was a precursor to the Camp David accords and helped set the foundation of mutually agreed upon principles, and this source provides those key details. The interpretation of the wording used in the resolution became a topic of controversy at Camp David.

We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land: A Plan That Will Work. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2009.

This source has contributed to my research process by providing insight into the reflections of one of the negotiators of the accords, Jimmy Carter. Through this, the ways in which negotiation works through diplomatic actions became more clear.

Secondary Sources

Al Jazeera Media Network. "The October Arab-Israeli War of 1973: What Happened?" Al

Jazeera. Last modified October 8, 2018. Accessed December 23, 2021.

<https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/10/8/the-october-arab-israeli-war-of-1973-what-happened>.

The War of 1973 between Egypt, Syria and Israel, also known as the October War or Yom Kippur War, was precipitated by the Six Day War. Egypt and Syria attempted to regain territory lost in 1967, although Sadat's motives could be attributed to other causes.

Anziska, Seth. *Preventing Palestine: A Political History from Camp David to Oslo*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018.

One of the central parts of historical research is developing an understanding of differing, and often opposing viewpoints. This book, published recently, provides a perspective on the impacts of the Camp David accords on the Palestinian statehood. Specifically, the author dives into the complexity of the consequences of Camp David, and claims that the peace between Israel and Egypt so often championed as a success was a failure to the Palestinian people

Barron, Robert, Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, and Michael Yaffe. "Middle East Peace: What Can We Learn from Camp David 40 Years Later?" United States Institute of Peace. Last modified March 25, 2019.

<https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/03/middle-east-peace-what-can-we-learn-camp-david-40-years-later>.

This article provided helpful analysis about the lasting effects of the Camp David Accords. It was particularly useful because it explained why these Accords were successful in comparison to other attempts at peace in the Middle East.

Bean, James W., and Craig S. Girard. "Anwar Al-Sadat's Grand Strategy in the Yom Kippur War." Defense Technical Information Center. Last modified 2001.

<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA442407.pdf>.

Sadat's strategy in the Yom Kippur War at first glance seems to be to regain territory lost in the Six Day War. However, upon further inspection, he desired to undermine Israel's military power and achieve political and diplomatic goals. He wanted to make Israel seem less powerful in the aftermath of the Six Day War.

Bowen, Jeremy. "1967 War: Six Days That Changed the Middle East." BBC News. Last modified June 5, 2017. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461>.

The Six Day War had profound consequences on Israel's relationship with its neighbors. The war radically changed Israel's borders. Their capture of territory and establishment of settlements following the war were issues that Camp David attempted to resolve.

Hurwitz, Harry, and Yisrael Medad, eds. *Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence*. Jerusalem, Israel: Gefen Publishing House, 2011.

This source is a collection of the speeches, addresses, and letters that make up the communication between Begin and Sadat throughout the Camp David peace process. It helped me track the correspondence between the two leaders and identify how they indirectly communicated through speeches and through letters passed along by Jimmy Carter when Egypt and Israel lacked formal diplomatic relations. It is listed as a secondary source because I cite the editor's notes in my paper, but the individual speeches and addresses are listed as primary sources as they are unedited.

"The Near East after the 1967 June War." Map. Palestine Portal. Accessed February 13, 2022.

<https://www.palestineportal.org/learn-teach/israelpalestine-the-basics/maps/maps-1967-to-present/>.

This map demonstrates the acquisition of territory through the 1967 war. It demonstrates one of the key conflicts the Camp David accords attempted to resolve.

"Six-Day War Maps: Israel's Pre-1967 Borders." Map. Jewish Virtual Library.

<https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/map-of-israel-s-pre-1967-borders>.

This map is of Israel before the 1967 war. It helps me understand the primary conflict at the Camp David accords, the acquisition of land during the Six-Day War.

Winston, Alex. "When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat Addressed the Knesset." The Jerusalem Post. Last modified November 20, 2020.

<https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/egypt-president-anwar-sadat-addresses-the-knesset-november-20-1977-649723>.

This article was helpful because it gave me a brief overview of the implications of President Sadat's address to the Knesset. With this background information, I can then read the text of the speech itself and understand its full meaning.

Wright, Lawrence. *Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014.

This book is a detailed account of the Camp David accords for the thirteen days it lasted. It was useful in getting a basic understanding of the events and chronology before diving into further research.

Yaffe, Michael, Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, and Robert Barron. "Half Right and Still Waiting." *The Cairo Review of Global Affairs*, no. 32 (Winter 2019). Accessed November 20, 2021. <https://www.thecaireview.com/essays/half-right-and-still-waiting/>.

This source was useful in comparing the two different sections of the camp David Accords. It helped me to formulate my own ideas as to why diplomacy works in some situations but not others.